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SHARIAH AND CHOICE: WHAT THE
UNITED STATES SHOULD LEARN
FROM ISLAMIC LAW ABOUT THE ROLE
OF VICTIMS' FAMILIES IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES
SUSAN C. HASCALL*
We ordained therein for them: "Life for life, eye for eye, nose for
nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal." But if
anyone remits the retaliation by way of charity, it is an act of
atonement for himself. And if any fail to judge by (the light of) what
Allah hath revealed, they are (No better than) wrong-doers.'

Under classical Islamic law, 2 homicide is considered an
individual wrong.3 As such, the family members of the victim have
the right to choose the punishment that is to be imposed. They may
choose to have the offender put to death. Or, they may choose to
collect a fine from the convicted person and his or her family. They
may even choose to forgive the convicted person without exacting
any fine. 4 This last option is encouraged and based on Qur'anicc
* B.A. Texas A&M University, M.A. The Wichita State University, J.D.
Washburn University, Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University.
1. THE QUR'AN 5:45 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., 2004).
2. By classical Islamic law, I refer not to the law as it is interpreted by
modern nation states, but rather the verses of the Qur'an itself, the widely
accepted interpretations of those verses as agreed upon by the various schools
of thought in Islamic law, and the canonical writings and collections of hadith
by the founders and most influential scholars of each of those schools of
thought. See RUDOLF PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

1-2, 6-8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (explaining the sources and
development of classical Islamic jurisprudence).
3. Homicide falls under the category of qisas wrongs. ABDUR RAHMAN I.
DOI, SHARI'AH: THE ISLAMIC LAW 232-33 (Ta Ha Publishers 1984). For wrongs
that are classified as qisas, the principle of private prosecution requires that
the individuals harmed by the act control the process of prosecution and
sentencing. PETERS, supra note 2, at 39.
4. See PETERS, supra note 2, at 39 (stating that the victim's next of kin
may pardon the person who commits willful homicide). Even though the
victim's family may pardon the murderer, the state maintains an interest in
punishing the offender and may inflict some punishment such as
imprisonment. Id. See also infra Part Two.I.C (discussing the ta'azir
punishments).
1
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text.5 In the United States, however, courts do not allow the family
members of a murder victim to even voice an opinion regardingthe
sentence to be imposed. Courts consider this testimony irrelevanteven when the victims do not want the death penalty to be imposed.
This refusal to allow the family members of the victims to
recommend a particularsentence is not simply the result of logical
application of the rules of evidence, relevance, state sentencing
statutes, or Supreme Court precedent (which is not clear when the
victims want to express their preference against execution). Rather,
it is the consequence of power struggles in Mediaeval England that
led to the current distinction between tort and crime.
Notwithstanding the designation of homicide as a crime against
the state in the West-and its theoretical justifications-it is the
family members of the victims who are the ones most affected by a
murder. The author of this Article argues that the true victims
should at the very least be allowed to voice an opinion on
sentencing in a capital case, particularly when they wish to
advocate mercy; for example, that the perpetrator of the crime
should not be put to death. Redefining the scope of permissible
victim impact testimony in state sentencing statutes to allow the
victims to voice their opinions on the proper sentence to be imposed
would demonstrate respect to those most personally affected by the
grief and horror of murder-the family members of the victims.
This approach would also be in accordance with the goals of the
victims' rights movement, the restorative justice movement,6 and
classical Islamic jurisprudence-from which we can learn a great
deal.
INTRODUCTION

The reinstitution of the death penalty in the United States
has raised a number of philosophical and moral questions that go
to the heart of the nation's jurisprudence. The United States
Supreme Court has declared that the imposition of the death
5. THE QUR'AN, supra note 1, at 5:45.
6. Both the victims' rights movement and the restorative justice
movement seek to integrate the victims of crime into the process of criminal
prosecution and sentencing. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 966-68 (1985) (listing proposals of the victims
rights movement); Maria-Pia Di Bella, "Victims of Crime" and "Victims of
Justice'"The Symbolic and FinancialAspects in U.S. Compensation Programs,
in WAGING WAR, MAKING PEACE: REPARATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 115,
115-117 (Barbara Rose Johnston & Susan Slyomovics eds., Left Coast Press
2009) (describing the various victims' rights movements); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (West Group 2d ed. 1986) (describing
"restoration" as a new theory of criminal punishment, and stating that the
objective of the restorative justice movement "is making amends for the
offending, particularly the harm caused to the victim, rather than inflicting
pain upon the offender.").

2010]1

Shari'ah and Choice

3

penalty is not per se unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.7 However, death penalty law and jurisprudence
remains rife with controversy. Since the reinstitution of the death
penalty, the Supreme Court has addressed a number of important
questions, such as what are cruel and unusual methods of
execution, 8 which crimes qualify for capital punishment,9 and
whether minors'o and mentally disabled individuals" may and
should be executed. In addition, in many death penalty cases the
Court has focused on the procedures necessary to protect the
fairness of a capital trial. 12
Following the Supreme Court's lead in emphasizing the
special importance of fairness in capital cases,13 many states have
devised unique procedures designed to protect the constitutional
integrity of the procedures involved in death penalty cases. As in
any criminal proceeding, in a capital case the jury initially
determines whether the defendant has committed the crime with
which she or he is charged. However, in death penalty cases there
7. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
8. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (stating that
"[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but
the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution. It implies there is [sic] something inhuman and
barbarous,-something more than the mere extinguishment of life."). The
Supreme Court has never found a method of execution (firing squad,
electrocution, gas chamber, hanging, or lethal injection) violative of the
constitution. Kenneth C. Haas, The Emerging Death Penalty Jurisprudenceof
the Roberts Court, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 387, 387-90, 436-38 (2008).
9. See Haas, supra note 8, at 387-90, 436-38 (discussing the limitations
on the types of crimes that can be punishable by execution). The death penalty
is unconstitutional for rape and robbery not involving the murder of the
victim. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917
(1977) (per curiam). It is also an unconstitutional punishment for co-felons
charged with felony murder who neither killed nor intended to kill the victim.
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
10. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (finding the execution
of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders to be unconstitutional).
11. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (overruling Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of mentally retarded offenders).
12. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) and
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-35 (1976) (holding mandatory death
sentences unconstitutional); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980)
(holding that aggravating circumstances must be clearly defined); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 625-26 (1980) (holding laws prohibiting judges telling
juries about lesser included offenses unconstitutional); Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430, 445-47 (1981) (holding that the double jeopardy clause applies
to the penalty phase of a capital trial).
13. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826-30 (1991) (focusing on
the fairness of a capital trial in holding victim impact testimony as
permissible); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170-87 (holding that the death penalty is
constitutional as long as legitimate guidelines and proper procedures are
followed in reaching the decision to impose it),

4
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is a second phase of the trial in which the jury decides whether the
defendant deserves to be sentenced to death. During the penalty
phase, the attorneys introduce mitigating and aggravating factors,
according to applicable state statutes. 14 At this stage, the defense
may offer evidence about the life of the convicted person as
mitigating evidence, and the prosecution may introduce evidence
about the nature of the crime to support a finding of excessive
cruelty, which in many states is an aggravating factor.15 In
addition to these aggravating and mitigating factors, the Supreme
Court has held that the jury may hear evidence concerning the
impact of the crime on the victim's family.' 6 However, the
overwhelming majority of courts do not allow these witnesses to
express their opinions regarding the penalty to be imposed,1 7 even
when the witnesses wish to recommend leniency.
There are two categories of evidence that victims can supply
at the sentencing phase of a capital trial: victim impact evidence
and victim opinion testimony. The Supreme Court addressed both
types of evidence in 1987 in Booth v. Maryland.18 There, the
Supreme Court held that testimony by the relatives of the victim
regarding the personal characteristics of the victim, the impact of
the crime on family members, and the harm caused by the murder
was impermissible and violative of the Eighth Amendment.' 9 The
Court also determined that victim opinion testimony, such as the
victims' opinions or characterizations of the defendant, the crime,
and the proper sentence to be imposed were not allowed. 20 The
Court reasoned that all such evidence was irrelevant because it
did not bear on the defendant's blameworthiness, and it was so
likely to elicit an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty based
on emotion rather than reason that admission of such evidence

14. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-207 (holding that the jury must consider
specific "aggravating" and "mitigating" circumstances of the offense, which
may include the defendant's character and record). Most death penalty
statutes require the jury to "weigh" aggravating and mitigating factors. Other
states require a threshold finding of an aggravating factor before the jury can
return a death sentence. LINDA E. CARTER, ELLEN S. KREITZBERG & ScoTT W.
HOWE, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 52-54 (LexisNexis 2d ed.
2008).
15. Id. at 95, 131-32.
16. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
17. See infra Part One.II.C (discussing victim participation in sentencing
decisions in the United States). See generally Joan T. Buckley, Annotation,
Victim Impact Evidence in CapitalSentence Hearings-Paynev. Tennessee, 79
A.L.R. 5th 33 § 11 [b] (2000) (collecting cases where the courts have dealt with
the admissibility of victim opinion testimony in capital cases).
18. See generally Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by
Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
19. Booth, 482 U.S. 503-07.
20. Id. at 507-09.
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would violate the defendant's constitutional rights.21
However, four years later, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Payne v. Tennessee.22 In that case, the Court held that
introducing victim impact testimony was relevant to the harm
caused by the crime and therefore not violative per se of the
defendant's constitutional rights. The Court did not, however,
directly address victim opinion testimony regarding sentencing, as
that issue was not before it. Most courts after the Payne decision
have interpreted that case to only partially overrule Booth and to
hold that the portion of Booth dealing with victim opinion
testimony remains intact. 23 Thus, the prevailing wisdom is that
such testimony is constitutionally impermissible in the penalty
phase of a capital trial.
One state stands alone in allowing victims to recommend a
sentence to the jury. Oklahoma state courts interpret Booth as
overruling the entire Payne decision by implication and therefore
hold that both victim impact testimony and victim opinion
testimony are not per se unconstitutional. 24 Furthermore, the
Oklahoma legislature defined relative victim impact testimony to
include victim opinion testimony in its death penalty sentencing
statute and thus allows victims to testify regarding the sentences
to be imposed. 25
The reasoning of the majority of courts that have interpreted
Payne as only partially overruling Booth, and thus disallowing
victim opinion testimony regarding sentencing, is logical to a
point. This is particularly true when the defendant asserts his or
her constitutional rights will be violated by the victims telling the
jury that they believe the defendant should be executed. After all,
the purpose of disallowing such testimony is to prevent the jury
from being incited by inflammatory rhetoric to impose a death
sentence based on irrelevant evidence in violation of the
Constitution. However, when confronted with a situation where it
is the defendant who proffers the victim opinion testimony, some
courts simply conclude the evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible
under the state sentencing statutes. Other courts, oddly, have
gone further. Those courts have concluded that even when victims
plan to tell the jury they do not recommend the death penalty, it is
21. Id.
22. Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
23. See infra Part One.II.C (discussing how different U.S. courts have
handled the use of victim opinion testimony).
24. See Conover v. State, 933 P.2d 904, 921 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997)
(holding that victim opinion as to the proper sentence is admissible if its
probative value is not outweighed by undue prejudice); Ledbetter v. State, 933

P.2d 880, 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that victim opinion about

proper sentencing was permissible both under the Eight Amendment and

Oklahoma law).
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 984(1) (1993).
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improper to admit that evidence because it would violate the
defendant's constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 26
The Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari in each
case since Payne that has raised the issue of victim opinion
testimony. This includes those cases from Oklahoma in which the
court allowed the victims to recommend a death sentence; it is also
true for the cases from other states that do not follow Oklahoma's
interpretation of Payne but still bar victims from asking for
leniency under the rational set forth in Booth.
The Supreme Court's approval of victim impact testimony has
been consistent with the wishes of most victims' rights advocates
in the United States who have called for a balancing of the victims'
rights with those guaranteed to the defendant under the
Constitution. 27 Members of the victims' rights movement seek to
impose harsher sentences for the perpetrators of crime and to have
the criminal justice system take into account the impact of crime
on the victims. 28 The movement has garnered significant attention
and has achieved some success in attempting to bring the voice of
the victims back into the decision-making process surrounding
charging, prosecution, trial, sentencing, and parole of
defendants. 29 Nevertheless, the victims of crimes still play a
relatively minor role in criminal process and procedure in the
United States today-even in Oklahoma. However, this model
need not continue to guide American legal thought.
This Article will examine the development of Anglo-American
legal thought to explain how the victims' family members lost the
right to decide whether the offender should live or die. This Article
26. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 2d. 1330, 1340-41 (S.D.
Ga. 2008) (finding inadmissible evidence that the widower of the murdered
person did not want the defendant put to death); State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d
1193, 1215 (Ariz. 2005) (refusing to allow a victim's husband to testify he did
not want the defendant executed even after the court had permitted the
prosecutor to elicit emotional impact testimony from the witness); Kaczmarek
v. State, 91 P.3d 16, 34 (Nev. 2004) (stating that "[w]e join our sister courts in
rejecting the proposition that opinions in opposition to the death penalty fall
within the parameters of admissible victim impact testimony or rebuttal
thereto."); Greene v. State, 37 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Ark. 2001) (refusing to allow
the defense to present a letter written by the victim's wife asking that the
defendant not be executed); Floyd v. State, 569 So.2d 1225, 1230 (Fla. 1986)
(refusing to allow as mitigating evidence testimony by the murder victim's
daughter that she and the victim opposed the death penalty); Barbour v.
State, 673 So.2d 461, 468-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (affirming the trial court's
refusal to allow the jury to hear the content of a letter written by the victim's
brother asking for leniency, relying on the reasoning by the Alabama Supreme
Court in ExparteMcWilliams, 640 So.2d 1015, 1017 (Ala. 1993)).
27. See generally Henderson, supra note 6.
28. See id. at 966-68 (listing proposals of the victim's rights movement).
29. See infra Part One.III.A (discussing the restorative justice movement).
See generally LAFAVE, supra note 6.
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relies on two principles. First, victim participation in prosecution
and sentencing has a long history in the common law and
European legal traditions.3 0 However, through the transformation
of homicide from a wrong against an individual to a crime against
the sovereign, victims eventually lost even the right to make a
statement to the jury as to the punishment the defendant
deserves. Second, although the United States does not officially
incorporate religious law into its federal or state law, the impact of
Judeo-Christian thought and legal traditions continues to
influence the debate surrounding the death penalty. These ideas
filter into courtrooms and influence courts' opinions regarding the
proper role of a victim in the sentencing stage of a death penalty
case and contribute to the marginalization of victims who wish to
give their opinions regarding the proper sentence to impose-even
when the victims would like the jury to show mercy by withholding
the death penalty.
By contrast, in the Islamic legal tradition, the role of the
victim has always been of paramount importance. 3 1 Islamic law
never experienced the upheavals caused by the fall of the Roman
Empire and the subsequent rise of feudalism, which led to the
classification of homicide as a crime against the state under AngloAmerican law; instead, under classical Islamic law, homicide is
classified as an individual wrong. 32 Thus, under classical Islamic
law, the family members of homicide victims retain their ability to
exert some control over the punishment to be inflicted by the state.
In addition, in contrast to the texts cited by proponents of the
death penalty that call for a "life for a life," in the Qur'an, the text
clearly encourages the victims to exercise mercy rather than to
extract the ultimate penalty.33 By focusing on the victims as those
who should make the life or death determination, the Qur'an
empowers them. The nations that incorporate classical Islamic
criminal law into their legal systems are prevented from removing
the victims from the process of sentencing. Because Islamic law
differs in these two substantial ways with regard to the role of the
victim in sentencing in a homicide case, examining Islamic law
provides a perfect mirror through which we may reexamine the
role of the victim in capital trials.
This Article does not advocate that victims replace authority
30. See Henderson, supra note 6, at 939-42 (describing the origins of
victim's rights in criminal law).
31.

See

MOHAMED

S.

EL-AWA,

PUNISHMENT

IN

IsLAMIc

LAw:

A

COMPARATIVE STUDY 69 (American Trust Publications 1982) (explaining the
role of the victim in Islamic legal tradition).
32. Id.
33. See THE QUR'AN, supra note 1, at 5:45 (stating that "if anyone remits
the retaliation by way of charity, it is an act of atonement for himself. And if
any fail to judge by (the light of) what Allah hath revealed, they are (No better
than) wrong-doers.").
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of the prosecutors, judges, or juries in deciding who should be
arrested, charged, or punished for crimes. Clearly, the state has an
interest in maintaining peace and order and preventing
vigilantism. However, this Article takes the position that family
members of victims should at least be permitted to voice an
opinion as to whether the defendant should be executed. This is
especially true when the interests of the defendant and the victims
coincide: where the victims call for mercy.
Although the Unites States Supreme Court has not yet
clarified the extent to which Payne overruled Booth, state
legislatures should consider enacting statutes that clearly define
victim impact testimony to include testimony regarding sentencing
opinions. Moreover, courts should develop case law permitting
such input from the victims. Permitting such testimony gives the
jury additional relevant evidence that it may consider or reject as
it deems appropriate.
A simple statement recommending the death penalty would
cause little additional prejudice to the defendant. After listening to
the emotional, tearful, and angry victim impact testimony, which
is permitted under Payne, most jurors would assume the family
members were in favor of the death penalty. Perhaps more
importantly, when the victims do not want the death penalty to be
imposed, they should not be subjected to the further trauma of the
defendant's execution without at least the chance to inform the
jury that they do not want the defendant to be put to death. For
some victims, expressing forgiveness would aid in their healing
process.
Part One of this Article reviews the history of the death
penalty in England and the United States and explains the
conversion of homicide from a private wrong to a crime against the
state. This section also examines the current trends in victim
participation in sentencing decisions in the United States. It will
include an analysis of the cases interpreting Payne and Booth, a
discussion of the victims' rights movements, and an analysis of the
secular and religious theories that support the death penalty.
Part Two discusses the classical Islamic doctrine regarding
the victims' participation in sentencing decisions in homicide
cases. A brief overview of the character, purpose, and sources of
Islamic law will be given. The Article will explain the taxonomy of
crimes under Islamic law, which differs substantially from the
taxonomy of crimes under Anglo-American law. The role of the
victim in the prosecution and punishment of a murderer will then
be examined. As a result of the classification of homicide as a qisas
crime-a crime not against G-d but against an individual-the
victims of such crimes retain important roles in sentencing
decisions. Special emphasis will be placed upon the victims to
remit the sentence of death for the murderer, as it stems from a
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very clear Qu'ranic directive encouraging mercy.
Part Three discusses a proposal for states to adopt legislation
that would permit the victims in a capital trial to express their
opinions on sentencing, particularly when they speak in favor of
mercy.
PART ONE: THE DEATH PENALTY AND VICTIM
PARTICIPATION IN SENTENCING IN THE WEST: THE ENGLISH
AND AMERICAN TRADITIONS
Capital punishment has long been a part of Western legal
tradition. 34 However, the forms of the death penalty, justifications
for the death penalty, and those with the power to impose the
death penalty have changed over time. It is not to be assumed that
the death penalty must be available as a punishment for certain
crimes. In fact, by embracing the death penalty, the United States
is out of step with other Western nations and with the majority of
states that are members of the United Nations. 35 Nevertheless, the
death penalty exists in the United States, and there is no
indication that the Supreme Court will find it unconstitutional in
the foreseeable future.36 Thus, it is incumbent upon lawyers,
judges, legislators, and academics to attempt to ensure that the
imposition of the death penalty is as fair as possible. This is the
path that the Supreme Court has taken in several cases dealing
with the procedures used in death penalty cases.37
34. By "Western" I mean the traditions and cultures that make up Western
Europe and the countries that were colonized by those Western powers and
remain in their world view and legal tradition dominated by ideas imported to
those countries by the colonizers, specifically, the United States.
35. See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries,AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.
(last
amnesty.orglen/death-penaltylabolitionist-and-retentionist-countries
visited Mar. 19, 2011) (providing statistics and explaining that "[miore than
two-thirds of the countries in the world have now abolished the death penalty
in law or practice.").
36. Justices Brennan and Marshall were steadfast opponents of the death
penalty. In Furman v. Georgia, they concluded that the death penalty was
unconstitutional under any circumstance. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 359-60 (Marshall,
J., concurring). After Gregg v. Georgia, where the court held capital
punishment to be constitutional under certain circumstances, either Justice
Brennan or Justice Marshall dissented in every death penalty opinion in
which the Court did not vacate the death sentence. No current member of the
Supreme Court takes such a position against the death penalty. In fact, some
have argued that today's Court shows much more support for the death
penalty than it has for decades. Cf., Haas, supra note 8, at 388 (arguing that
the Robert's Court has become more reluctant to impose limitations on the
death penalty or to grant capital defendants meaningful procedural
safeguards).
37. This is the path that the Supreme Court has taken in several cases
dealing with the procedures used in death penalty cases. See, e.g., Payne, 501
U.S. 825-27 (focusing on the fairness of a capital trial in holding victim impact
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The pertinent question, however, is whether the definition of
"fair" used by the courts should be expanded to take into
consideration the fairness, or lack thereof, to the actual persons
harmed by the murder. We should reexamine our notion of
fairness in the context of death penalty trials in light of current
sensibilities rather than rely on unexamined assumptions based
on antiquated notions that deprive the victims of the crime a voice
in sentencing. Victims' participation in sentencing should be
reexamined in light of their current utility and must be justified
according to modern circumstances and sentiments. Furthermore,
the reasoning courts use to stop even calls for mercy by applying
the applicable statutory rules and Supreme Court precedent is
flawed. For these reasons, American courts and legislatures should
change the prevailing death penalty rules that define permissible
victim impact testimony at sentencing to include statements
regarding the proper penalty to be imposed.

I.

THE ENGLISH TRADITION

At this juncture, it is useful to this discussion to review the
history of the death penalty in the West-with special emphasis on
England and the United States-and the circumstances that led to
the victims of crime losing all control of criminal sentencing
decisions. As this section will show, the distinction between a
crime and a private wrong is not something that was inevitable or
that was an unavoidable part of the natural evolution or
development of criminal law in the West.3 8 Rather, many of the
ideas Americans take for granted, like the distinction between a
crime and a tort, are not necessarily based on anything other than
historical happenstance and the result of power struggles. By
reexamining the history of the death penalty and the development
of modern criminal law, the reader should gain some perspective
on the insistence of some courts to deny the victims of murder the
right to give opinion testimony on sentencing, even when the
victims call for mercy.

testimony is permissible).
38. This author does not agree with the evolutionary thesis adhered to by
nineteenth century writers who believed that Victorian civilization
represented the highest and most developed, rational, and perfect of all
civilizations past and present, and that any variation from the Victorian forms
of government were primitive, or at least less advanced than Western forms.
See, e.g., SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH
THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (Dorset

Press 1986) (1861) (arguing that law has a course of development, similar to
macro biological evolution, with English law representing the most developed
form of law).
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History of the Death Penalty in England

In the West, as in many other parts of the world, the killing of
killers has long been practiced. Even before the Roman conquest of
Western Europe, 39 there is evidence that execution was practiced
by the indigenous population. However, the first written records
dealing with the death penalty in the West come to us from the
time of the Romans. 40 The Romans codified death penalty law
around 300 B.C.E. in the Twelve Tables of Rome. 41 In Britain, the
Roman law was the law of the land until Rome officially withdrew
from Britain in the year 410 C.E.42
After the Romans left Britain, the infrastructure they had
built began to crumble. The Roman law was also a casualty of the
chaos and disorder that plagued Britain in the post-Roman
period. 43 It was gradually replaced by the Germanic legal
traditions of the invaders, including the Saxons, Angles, Jutes,
and Danes, who also practiced execution as the penalty for certain
crimes. This period of English legal history will be discussed in the

39. For more than three hundred years, Rome controlled vast expanses of
Western Europe and began its conquest of England in earnest in the first
century. See generally LISI OLIVER, THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH LAW (Univ.
of Toronto Press 2002).
40. The influence of Roman law in the West is well documented, and even
after the fall of Rome, it retained influence in Western Europe through the
adoption and influence of the Code Justinian, which forms the basis of most of
the legal systems in Western Europe. HANS JULIUS WOLFF, ROMAN LAW: AN
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 3-6 (Univ. of Oklahoma Press 1951).
41. See WOLFF, supra note 40, at 56, 59 (noting that there is some
disagreement among scholars as to the exact date and composition of what is
now referred to as the Twelve Tables of Rome). In addition to intentional
homicide, the Twelve Tables provided capital punishment for other crimes

committed against individuals. Id. at 53. Among these crimes were arson, evil
incantation, and the theft of crops at night. Id.

42. Id. at 4. Rome began to lose control of Western Europe in the fifth

century as it withdrew from the further-flung colonies in order to defend
against threats from northern tribes and deal with other problems closer to
home. OLIVER, supra note 39, at 4. At this time, the Saxons and other
Germanic tribes began to increase their attacks on Britain. Id. at 3. Local
indigenous leaders arose to fight the invaders. Id.
43. Although Roman law and the later civil-law tradition were never

formally adopted as sources of either English or American law, several
scholars have argued that Roman law had an important influence on both
legal systems. MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH

CENTURY 1-2, 5 (The Univ. of Georgia Press 1997); Peter Stein, The Attraction
of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403-34
(1966),reprinted in THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL

LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 411-42 (Hamledon Press 1988). See also G.R.Y.
RADCLIFFE

& GEOFFREY

CROSS,
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ENGLISH

LEGAL SYSTEM
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(Butterworth & Co., Ltd. 3d ed. 1954) (discussing the renaissance of Roman

Law during the eleventh century and its influence on Canon law and the role
of both in the making of English law until the fourteenth century).
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next section, as it was during this time period that homicide began
to be classified as a crime against the state rather than a private
wrong.
When the Normans conquered England in 1066, they brought
with them Norman legal traditions, which they imposed to some
extent on the local populations. 44 After the Conquest, execution
was common and was usually accomplished by hanging the
convicted person.45 In the later Middle Ages, execution was often
accompanied by torture, 46 but certain persons were exempt from
the death penalty under the doctrine of the privilege or "benefit of
clergy."4 7 Once colonies were established abroad, even criminals
without the benefit were often transported in lieu of execution. 48
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, reform
measures were taken in Britain and in the United States, and the
number of capital crimes gradually declined, as did the number of
executions. 49 Following the publication of Dei Delitti e Delle Pene,
44. A.K.R. KIRALFY, POTTER'S OUTLINES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 7-10
(Sweet & Mazwell Ltd. 5th ed. 1958) (1923).
45. Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in SOCIETY'S FINAL
SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY (Laura E.
Randa ed., 1997), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/execution/readings/history.html. However, the first Norman ruler of
England, William the First (William the Conqueror), disliked execution and
placed a moratorium on hanging for any offense. Id.; Frederick C. Millett, Will
the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the World) in Abandoning
Capital Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 547, 551 (2008). William the
Conqueror preferred mutilation. Reggio, supra; Millett, supra, at 551.
46. Reggio, supra note 45. During the Middle Ages, a variety of techniques
were used to put a person to death. Id. These included hanging, drowning,
burning, drawing and quartering, pressing, and beheading. Id. The types of
crimes for which the penalty of death could be imposed included high and
petty treason, as well as all felonies. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 476 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed.
1911). By the reign of George III, in the mid-eighteenth century, there were
over two hundred crimes punishable by death, including petty theft. DAVID D.
COOPER, THE LESSONS OF THE SCAFFOLD: THE PUBLIC EXECUTION
CONTROVERSY INVICTORIAN ENGLAND 27 (Ohio Univ. Press 1974).
47. See SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 26 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 2d ed. 1890) (discussing the
benefit of clergy in the thirteenth century). Under this doctrine, members of
the clergy were often exempted. Id. The exemption was later extended to
literate persons. John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision: The
Enlightenment, America's Death Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW.
J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 195, 218 n.143 (2009); see STEPHEN, supra, at 35-36
(discussing the development of the benefit of clergy). They were, however
branded with an "M" for murder or a "T"' for other felonies and were allowed
only one exemption. Bessler, supra, at 31; see STEPHEN, supra, at 36
(discussing the limitations placed on the benefits and noting that murder was
removed from clergyable offenses during the reign of Edward VI, in the midsixteenth century).
48. Bessler, supra note 47, at n.61.
49. Reggio, supra note 45; COOPER, supra note 46, at 27.
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by Cesare Bonesana Beccaria in 1764, the opponents of harsh
penalties for petty crimes began to mobilize in England.5 0 The
leaders of this movement included English philosopher Jeremy
Bentham and the statesman Sir Samuel Romilly.5 1 In the early
1800s, Sir Romilly six times introduced bills to Parliament that
would have abolished the death penalty for petty crimes such as
shoplifting goods valued at five shillings. 52 The House of Commons
passed each of the bills, but each was defeated in the House of
Lords. 53
B. Current Trends: Abolition of the Death Penalty in the West
By the mid-nineteenth century, the reformers and
abolitionists had gained some traction in Europe, parts of the
United States, and in South America. 54 In 1868, in a first step
toward abolition, Parliament passed the Capital Punishment
Within Prisons Bill, which ended the spectacle of public
executions.5 5 However, it was not until 1965 that capital
punishment was finally abolished in the United Kingdom.56 The
death penalty has now been abolished in almost all of the nations
of Europe5 7 and in 138 countries world-wide.58 It has also been
condemned by the General Assembly of the United Nations.59 The
50. COOPER, supra note 46, at 29 (citing CESARE BONESANA BECcARIA, DEI
DELLITI E DELLE PENE (AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS) 93 (Phillip
H. Nicklin trans., 1819)).
51. Id. at 29-31. The reformers observed that rather than actually
imposing disproportionately harsh penalties for relatively minor crimes,
judges were tending to find the accused guilty of lesser offenses-ones that
were not punishable by death. Id. at 33. This, they argued, worked against
deterrence of crime in that the certainty of a milder punishment was a better
deterrent to crime than the possibility of a severe punishment. Id. at 29-30,
32.
52. Id. at 33.
53. Id. at 33.
54. Id. at 144.
55. Id. at 175-76.

56. The last executions in England happened on August 13, 1964. ANTHONY
STOKES & THEODORE DALRYMPLE, PIT OF SHAME: THE REAL BALLAD OF
READING GAOL xv (Waterside Press 2007).
57. In its Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Union declared:
"Everyone has the right to life," and "[n]o one shall be condemned to the death
penalty, or executed." Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
14 Dec. 2007, art. 2, 2007 O.J. (C303) 3.
58. See Cruel, Discriminatory, Unfair and Degrading-The Death Penalty
in 2008, AMNESTY INT'L (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-andupdates/cruel-discriminatory-unfair-and-degrading-%E2%80%93-death-penat
y-2008-20090323 [hereinafter The Death Penalty in 2008] (stating that fiftynine countries retain the death penalty as of 2008).
59. In the year 2007, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
a non-binding resolution supporting a moratorium on the death penalty. G.A.
Res. 62/149, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/149 (Dec. 18, 2007). In its resolution, the
United Nations stated that human rights and human dignity are furthered by
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United States has not followed the global trend of abolishing the
death penalty.60

C. From Private Right to a Crime against the State: A History
of Victim Participationin Sentencing Decisions in England
Today, in the United States and in England, the victims of
violent crimes cannot prosecute the perpetrator under the criminal
law, nor can they control the penalty imposed by the state. The
wrong-if it is severe enough-is classified as a crime. Therefore,
it is not the individual who was wronged who has the power to
prosecute or (in the most serious cases) to execute an offender;
that power belongs to the state. The following section of this
Article will explain how the victims of homicide have lost control
over prosecution and punishment of the murderer in the AngloAmerican legal system, which eventually led to the victims losing
even the right to suggest a sentence to the jury.
In the early Roman period, intentional homicide was
punishable by death.6 1 However, it was considered a private wrong
against an individual citizen, and the relatives of the victims were
involved in the punishment of the murderer. 62 Yet in the Republic
period, the power of the victims to control prosecution and
sentencing began to wane. Murder was classified as a public
offense and was therefore prosecuted by state officials. 63 The

the abolition of the death penalty. Id. The United Nations called for all states
that are parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to
strive to abolish the death penalty, if they had not done so already. Id. at 1
2(d). For those states that would refuse to abolish the death penalty, the
General Assembly urged them to reduce the number of offenses for which the
death penalty may be imposed. Id. at I 2(c). The General Assembly also urged
those states to not impose the death penalty on any person who was under
eighteen years old at the time of their crime, to exclude pregnant women from
the death penalty, and to exclude persons suffering from any form of mental
disorder from the death penalty. See id. at 1 2(a) (citing the Economic and
Social Council resolution 1984/50 (May 25, 1984), which sets out these
limitations).
60. In 2008, at least 2,390 people were executed in twenty-five countries,
including the United States, and at least 8,864 people were sentenced to death
in fifty-two states around the world, including the United States. The Death
Penalty in 2008, supra note 58.
61. WOLFF, supranote 40, at 52-53.
62. Id. After murder was codified in the Twelve Tables, the state probably
performed the actual execution, but the individuals who were actually harmed
had the right to decide whether the accused should be prosecuted in the first
instance. Id. at 53.
63. Id. As did later English law, Roman law took into account the social
status of both the victim and the convicted person when the death penalty was
at issue. Reggio, supra note 40. Certain crimes were punishable by execution if
committed by a slave, but not if committed by a freemen or nobility. See id.
(stating that the death penalty "was punishment for crimes such as the
publication of libels and insulting songs, the cutting or grazing of crops
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execution of a murderer was likewise a state responsibility. 64 After
Rome withdrew from Britain,65 the distinction between public and
private crimes was lost.66
In England, under the early Anglo-Saxon period, the blood
feud served as the main deterrence to the commission of murder.67
When a person was murdered, the victim's family resorted to selfhelp in order to seek retribution. They would instigate a private
war against the perpetrator and his family. Under this system, the
wishes of the victim's family were tightly integrated into criminal
prosecution.6 8 In addition to providing the victims with an avenue
to attain retribution, the blood feud was also a way to repair the
social rupture created by the murder.6 9 As such, the whole
community participated in the feud by withdrawing its protection
from the individual who had committed the crime.7 o
During the fifth and sixth centuries, the kings of certain parts
of what would later become England began to draft codes of law.7 1
Through these codes, they began to limit the extent of vengeance
injured parties were allowed to extract through the blood feuds. 72
planted by a farmer, the burning [of] a house or a stack of corn near a house,
cheating by a patron of his client, perjury, making disturbances at night in the
city, willful murder of a freeman or a parent, or theft by a slave").
64. WOLFF, supra note 40, at 53.
65. See Henderson, supra note 6, at 938-39 (stating that the fall of the
Roman Empire left most of Europe without centralized government or formal
codes of law).
66. As discussed previously, during this period, England was invaded by a
number of Germanic tribes that forced out or subjugated the indigenous Celtic
and Pictish inhabitants. See GEORGE W. KEETON, ENGLISH LAW: THE
JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION 10 (David & Charles 1974) (stating that after the
Saxons lost power in the middle of the eleventh century, England had
achieved unity and stability within its borders).
67. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 46, at 31-32 (discussing the
importance of the family in Anglo-Saxon society and its function of
maintaining social control through the blood feud); see also RADCLIFFE &
CROSS, supra note 43, at 6 (discussing the blood feud under the early AngloSaxon kings). A "blood feud" is defined as the process of "[a]venging the killing
of kin on the person who killed him, or on his family." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 157 (5th ed. 1979).
68. Henderson, supra note 6, at 939.
69. Id.
70. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 154 (Sweet & Mazwell Ltd. 5th ed. 1958)
(1923).

71. As stated previously, these were largely based on the local legal
traditions, or customary law, of the peoples who had settled the area. See
OLIVER, supra note 39, at 71-81, 99-105 (listing and then discussing the
wergild lists of King Aethelberht). See also KEETON, supra note 66, at 62
(noting that by the time of the Conquest, "English law [was] divided into three
great customary systems, with innumerable local variations tenaciously
maintained. These customary laws still existed in the reign of Henry I, and
they were still Saxon and Danish. As yet the Common Law was scarcely
glimpsed.").
72. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 154. For example, the number of churls who
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The "law of wrongs," as it was called, had some aspects that made
it similar to criminal law. During this period, however, the Crown
did not have charging authority when the injury was to an
individual. Those who were personally harmed still had the
responsibility of coming forward to request redress from the
authorities. 73 Furthermore, during this period the injured parties
were not bound to go to the authorities to request justice; however,
they maintained the option of seeking personal redress for the
wrong. 74
In the later periods of the Anglo-Saxon domination of
England, the law of wrongs became more complex. The authorities
began to exert further control over the victims of violent crimes by
encouraging them to accept monetary compensation rather than
seek blood vengeance.75 The wer provided for compensation to
victims for every injury,76 including homicide.77 The wer lists set
the wergild, or value of a person's life according to his rank.78 If a
could be killed to compensate for the murder of a thane was limited to six. Id.
In the later stages of Anglo-Saxon law, the blood feud could lawfully be
conducted only after the aggrieved parties had demanded and been refused
payment in the form of set tariffs for each type of injury. Id.
73. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 43, at 6-7 (discussing the early
attempts to limit private feuds through requiring the offenders to pay
compensation to the injured parties, but noting that acceptance of the
compensation was not mandatory, and that the law was powerless to force the
victims to accept payment in lieu of feuding).
74. Id. at 7; KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 153.
75. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 153-54 (citing POLLOCK AND MAITLAND,
supra note 46). Outlawry was also displaced during this period. Id. Potter's
Outlines describe outlawry as a punishment for the worst of offenses. Id. If a
person was declared an outlaw, he or she was beyond the protection of the
community and subject to abuse by any member of the community. Id. at 154.
See also 1 PATRICK WORMALD, THE MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW: KING ALFRED
TO THE TWELFTH CENTURY 96 (Blackwell Publishers 1999) (discussing the
importance of codification of the traditional law in England and noting that
these codes served to allow for an alternative to feuding by providing
compensation to the victim).
76. OLIVER, supra note 39, at 71-81, 411-42; Alan N. Young, The Role of the
Victim in the Criminal Process: A Literature Review-1989 to 1999, VICTIMS
OF CRIME RES. DIG., Aug. 2001, at 6, available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
pi/rs/rep-rap/2000/rrOOvic20/rr00_vic20.pdf; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 46, at 53.
77. See OLIVER, supra note 39, at 65-71 (discussing the wergild lists of King
Aethelberht). Of course, during this time period of the sixth and seventh
centuries, England was not united, but rather it consisted of a number of
kingdoms. The Laws of Aethelberht were essentially the laws of the Kingdom
of Kent. Id. at 8.
78. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 154. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
supra note 67, at 1430 (defining "wera" or were as "[tihe estimation or price of
a man, especially of one slain. In the criminal law of the Anglo-Saxons, every
man's life had its value, called a 'were' or 'capitis aestimatio."').This payment
was called the weregild or wergild. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67,
at 1430-31.
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person was killed, the wrongdoer or his family was required to pay
the victim's family the amount of his wergild.79 This compensation
to the victim was intended to deter feuding and blood vengeance.s0
Later, part of the wergild was paid to the king as compensation for
the loss of his subject and to the victim's lord as compensation for
the loss of his vassal.81
In addition to providing the victims of wrongs with
compensation, the early Anglo-Saxon codes also provided the
central authorities power to collect fines and punish wrongs. The
authorities could extract payment from a wrongdoer by imposing a
wite, which was a fine. 82 Unlike the wer, the purpose of the wite
was not to provide compensation to victims as an alternative to
blood vengeance, but rather it was meant to merely punish the
wrongdoer.88 The fine was payable to the king, but might also
include some payment to the "public authority."84
The Anglo-Saxon law also classified certain wrongs that were
punishable by the authorities in the first instance. The botleas
were wrongs for which no bot could be paid; in other words, they
were "botless" crimes.85 Persons convicted of a botlea, were
required to surrender both their bodies and their goods to the
authorities.8 6 As it was in the interest of the Crown's finances for a
wrong to be classified as a botlea, the number of offenses so
categorized increased until the eleventh century8 7 and eventually

79. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 154.
80. RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 43, at 6 (referring to the bots as early
attempts to restrict feuding).
81. The wergild was paid "partly to the king for the loss of a subject, partly
to the lord for the loss of a vassal, and partly to the next of kin of the injured
person. In the Anglo-Saxon laws, the amount of compensation varied with the
degree or rank of the party slain." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at
1430. Unlike the wer, which required a fixed payment to the victim of the
wrong according to the value of the person harmed-which was tied to his
rank-the bot was a payment more closely tied to the particular harm done by
the act. RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 43, at 6. The bot would be paid to
compensate the person injured and was fixed according to the injury
sustained, rather than tied to the rank of the person himself. Id. If a person
was murdered, his or her relations might demand payment of the amount of
his wer rather than the bot amount for homicide. STEPHEN, supra note 47, at
10-11 (discussing the substitution of wer for bot and describing the bot lists of
King Alfred's laws).
82. STEPHEN, supra note 47, at 11.
83. WORMALD, supra note 75, at 105 (discussing the concepts of wer and
wite under King Ine of Kent).
84. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 154.
85. RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 43, at 7.

86. Id. See also KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 155 (explaining that these
wrongs were so serious that they could be redressed with only "afflictive"
punishment). These crimes included treason, sacrilege, and cowardice. Id.
87. RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 43, at 7.
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included murder.88 Nevertheless, prior to the Norman Conquest,
the blood feud remained a common practice and served alongside
the codified penalties and payments as a deterrent to murder.8 9
As the power of the kings grew, the concept of an offense
against the state began to expand.90 The wer, wite, and botlea were
eventually rendered obsolete as the theory of the King's Peace
developed. 91 The breach of such required the payment of a fine to
the Crown, but the actual victim was still entitled to some
compensation. 92 Over time, the concept of the King's Peace began
to grow, and the number of wrongs that were answerable to the
Crown rather than to another individual began to increase.93
These wrongs could be litigated in the nascent royal courts of
England and were called Pleas of the Crown. 94 Eventually, Pleas of
the Crown included all breaches of the King's Peace, which by the
twelfth century included homicide.95
The fines incurred for these violations either went to the
Crown itself, or were dolled out to prelates and thanes.9 6 Either
88. Prior to the Norman Conquest, murder was classified as a botleas.
KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 159. In the thirteenth century, felonies became

distinguished from misdemeanors. Both were considered breaches of the
King's Peace; however murder, of course, was considered a felony. Id. A felony
was distinguished from other wrongs by being punishable by death.
Henderson, supra note 6, at 939. See also Young, supra note 76, at 6 (stating
that early attempts at state regulation of wrongdoing were largely premised
upon eradication and containment of the blood feud, where "blood" referred to
kinship ties as opposed to the viciousness of the feud).
89. See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 46, at 31 (noting that "[i]n
England the legalized blood-feud expired almost within living memory, when
the criminal procedure by way of 'appeal' was finally abolished.").
90. Henderson, supra note 6, at 939; Young, supra note 76, at 6.
91. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 155. Originally, the sphere of the King's
Peace consisted only of the personal space surrounding the king, or on certain
holy days, it might include a wider area of England. Id. Eventually, however,
any form of violence or disorder in any part of the realm could be considered a
breach of the King's Peace, including homicide. RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra
note 43, at 35 (stating that by the end of the twelfth century, all offenses
involving breaches of the peace were considered Pleas of the Crown, including
homicide).
92. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 155-56.
93. Id. at 155.
94. The first plea to the Crown was filed in the time of King Cnut, in the
eleventh century. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 155. Under the Saxon kings,
there were many courts that had confusing and overlapping jurisdiction to
hear claims relating to individual wrongs. Pleas of the Crown could be brought
based on official or individual complaints of breaches of the King's Peace.
When a person was found to have breached the King's Peace, the guilty person
was made to surrender his holdings and goods to the Crown. Id.
95. RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 43, at 35. Wrongs that could be brought
as Pleas of the Crown included not only serious crimes such as homicide, but
also included lesser wrongs such as individual assault. KIRALFY, supra note
44, at 155.
96. KIRALFY, supra note 44, at 155.
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way, this was a money-making enterprise and helped to
consolidate the power of the central authority.9 7 The Crown was
also charged with inflicting punishment on the defendant's body.98
This signaled a shift from victim-centered criminal prosecution to
one co-opted by the state.99 As a result, the victims of crimes lost
the ability to control the prosecution and punishment of those who
had committed violent crimes.100 The private wrong had become a
public crime.
II. THE AMERICAN TRADITION
As a colony of Great Britain, the law regarding the death
penalty in the colonial period of the United States mirrored to a
great extent that of the mother country. The concept of homicide
as a crime against the state was never questioned.10 ' Nor was the
distinction between a private wrong (a tort) and a crime
questioned, as this was a concept inherited from Mediaeval
English law, as discussed above. Nevertheless, the governors of
the American territories were given certain latitude to fashion
their own criminal laws, and there was some variation among the
colonies in regard to the death penalty.102 Some of this variation
may be due to the unique history of each colony, the dominant

97. Id. Eventually, crimes that could be brought as Pleas of the Crown
included almost every type of wrong, and the power of the victims of crimes to
control prosecution and sentencing of crimes involving personal injury waned.
Ultimately, wrongdoers would be punished by forfeiting all their property to
the Crown rather than to the actual victims of the crime. See also WORMALD,
supra note 75, at 105 (discussing how the early kings of England made
financial gains through codifying crime and then extracting payment from the
wrongdoers through the fines imposed in those codes).
98. Not only would the Crown confiscate the convicted person's property,
the authorities were also charged with punishing the body of the perpetrator.
This could take a number of forms such as torture, imprisonment in a
dungeon, and/or execution. Young, supra note 76, at 6.
99. Henderson, supra note 6, at 940-41.
100. Id.
101. The earliest capital offenses within the American colonies included such
crimes as idolatry, witchcraft, sodomy, adultery, blasphemy, rebellion, perjury
in a capital trial, burglary, assault in sudden anger, man-stealing, rape,
statutory rape, and murder. Millett, supra note 45, at 585 (citing HUGO ADAM
BEDAU, GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA 5 (Hugo
Adam Bedau ed., 1967)). These are taken from the Massachusetts Bay Colony
in 1636. Id. In 1837, however, other states, such as North Carolina, had even
stricter codes, requiring the death penalty for offenses such as: stealing bank
notes, concealing a slave with intent to free him, circulating seditious
literature amongst slaves, dueling if death occurs, and the second offense of
forgery. Id. Following the English tradition, all crimes that were considered
felonies were punishable by execution. Bessler, supra note 47, at 216 n.135.
102. See Millett, supra note 45, at 585 (discussing the "Capital Laws of NewEngland" of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which listed numerous capital
offenses).
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religion of the colony, and the social background of the colonists. 103
There was inconsistency in the use of the death penalty
between the northern and southern colonies.1 04 The northern
colonies tended to impose capital punishment most frequently for
crimes against morality, probably owing to their Puritan roots;
whereas the southern colonies tended to impose the death penalty
as a means to protect property, including the institution of
slavery.105 As the Euro-American colonizers moved westward, they
entered areas where there were few government officials, judges,
and police officers to keep the peace and distribute justice.
In the first part of the twentieth century, the disparity
between the north and the south's imposition of the death penalty
became even more evident. Northern states began limiting the use
of the death penalty, and some abolished it all together, while
southern states were still employing capital punishment for a
number of offenses. 06 These historical and cultural differences
remain today. 0 7 As will be described below, the modern courts
that are deciding cases involving victim opinion testimony are
influenced by the historical forces that shaped American concepts
of homicide and victim rights. This is especially evident when
103. Cf. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE COUSIN'S WARS: RELIGION, POLITICS, CIVIL
WARFARE, AND THE TRIUMPH OF ANGLO-AMERICA (Perseus Books Group 2000)
(discussing the ancient divisions among the inhabitants of Great Britain and
the United States and postulating that the English Civil War, the
Revolutionary War, and the American Civil War were all wars between the
same or similar alignments of religious and ethnic groups in the British Isles);
DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH FOLKWAYS IN
AMERICA (Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (where the author describes distinct
folkways emerging in the Americas based on divisions that had long existed in
Great Britain).
104. Millett, supra note 45, at 585.
105. Id. (citing STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY 7 (2002)). For example, in the South, if a slave destroyed any
manufactured good or enticed other slaves to flee it was a capital offense. Id.
at 586.
106. Id. at 586.
107. Id. Michigan was the first state to abolish the death penalty for murder,
although it retained the death penalty for treason. Id. Thereafter, both Rhode
Island and Wisconsin abolished the death penalty for all crimes. Id. The first
state to reinstitute the death penalty after Furman v. Georgia (which
abolished (temporarily) the death penalty) was a southern state, Florida. See
Charles W. Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson, Florida'sLegislative Response to
Furman: An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1973).
Between 1976 and 2008, the fewest executions occured in the north-eastern
states, the most in the south and southwest. State Execution Rates, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 17, 2009), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/stateexecution-rates. In that timeframe, Texas was the leader in the number of
executions per year, with Virginia and Oklahoma following close behind. Id.
Texas did not lead the states in the number of per capita executions. Id.
Although Texas has executed the highest number of death row prisoners since
1976, Oklahoma had the highest per capita rate of execution. Id.
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courts struggle to justify denying victims the right to give
sentencing testimony recommending mercy.
The Constitutionalityof the Death Penalty in the
Modern United States
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court began issuing a series of
opinions that would significantly alter death penalty
jurisprudence in the United States. In a 1971 case, McGautha v.
California,the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional to
permit a jury in a capital case to determine both guilt and the
penalty to be imposed in a single phase of trial. 0 8
However, only one year later, the Supreme Court decided
Furman v. Georgia.09 The decision consisted of a one paragraph,
per curiam opinion as well as separate opinions written by each of
the nine justices.110 In Furman, the Court held that the death
penalty statutes of Georgia and Texas violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments."' The justices' rationales for the
holding ranged from the statutes being cruel and unusual in their
operation, to being arbitrarily inflicted, to the death penalty being
cruel and unusual under any circumstances, to the penalty being
too infrequently imposed. 112 Following Furman, it was clear that
the Texas and Georgia death penalty statutes were
unconstitutional, but the reason for their unconstitutionality
remained unclear.113 Thus, many states rewrote their death
penalty statutes in hopes that they would conform to the Court's
A.

standards, whatever they were.114

Some states redesigned their capital punishment statutes to
make the death penalty mandatory punishment for certain

108. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971), vacated, Crampton v.
Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
109. Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
110. Id. at 239-40.
111. Id. at 240. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall
filed opinions in support of the judgment. See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackman, Powell, and Rehnquist filed
dissenting opinions. See generally id. None of the majority joined in another
Justice's opinion. See generally id.
112. See generally id.
113. Millett, supra note 45, at 595 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238) ("In
response to Furman, the states had three practical options: (1) get rid of the
death penalty completely; (2) rewrite their death penalty statutes, making the
death penalty mandatory punishment for those convicted of a capital crime; or
(3) rewrite their death penalty statute so that it was imposed in a less
discriminatory ... manner.").

114. Id. at 595-96 (noting that seven states did not rewrite their death
penalty statute, ten rewrote it to impose a mandatory death sentence upon
conviction of certain crimes, and twenty-five states rewrote their statutes to
allow the jury to impose the death penalty).
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statutes

as

unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolinain 1976.116 On the

same day, however, a plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia held
that "the punishment of death does not invariably violate the
Constitution.""t7 The Georgia statute that the Court found to be
constitutional required a bifurcated trial, separating the guilt
phase from the sentencing phase of the trial. It also required a
review of each death sentence by the state's supreme court to
ensure that the penalty was not being applied excessively.118 After
this holding, it became clear that for the death penalty to be
constitutionally applied, the implementing statute must allow for
jury discretion and provide specific guidelines for a jury to follow
when deciding whether to impose the death penalty." 9
After the Supreme Court declared the death penalty
constitutional under certain circumstances, legislators began to
pass reforms to death penalty laws designed to temper the use of
the death penalty, limiting the crimes for which it could be
imposed and requiring more humane methods for execution. In
addition, public executions were eliminated, and the jury began to
have a greater role in determining whether the death penalty
would be applied.120 Further limiting the broad power of the states
to implement the death penalty,121 the Supreme Court held the
certain
under
unconstitutional
death
penalty to be
circumstances. 122
115. Id. at 596.
116. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
117. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187. In Gregg, a Georgia defendant was convicted of
armed robbery and murder and was sentenced to death. Id. at 158. He
challenged the sentence based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution. Id. at 168. The Court established a two-part
test. "First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain." Id. at 173. "Second, the punishment must not be grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id.
118. Id. at 163. A "bifurcated trial" is one where sentencing is based on
certain aggravating circumstances as determined by a jury in a separate trial
than the trial in which guilt was decided. Id. at 195.
119. Millett, supra note 45, at 598.
120. Id. at 586-87.
121. After the Gregg decision, the ten-year moratorium on the death penalty
ended with a 1977 Utah execution. John H. Blume, Killing the
Willing:"Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 939-40
(2005); Dr. Saby Ghoshray, Tracing the Moral Contours of the Evolving
Standardsof Decency: The Supreme Court's Capital JurisprudencePost-Roper,
45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 561, 598 n.136 (2006); Millett, supra note 45, at 598.
122. For example, the Supreme Court has recently held that when a
defendant is mentally disabled, the state shall not impose the death penalty.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002). The Court has also held
unconstitutional the execution of a defendant who was a minor child at the
time of the offense. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). In addition,
the Court held that the death penalty may only be imposed for the most
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Due to perceptions of unfairness, ineffectiveness to prevent
crime, or other concerns, there is a growing movement to abolish
the death penalty in the United States. 123 Nevertheless, a majority
of Americans support the death penalty,124 and each state has the
power to decide whether or not to permit the death penalty. 125
Currently, thirty-six states permit the death penalty, and fifteen,
including the District of Columbia do not permit the death
penalty.126 Because the majority of cases that involve capital
offenses come from southern and western states, the jurisprudence
regarding the death penalty and the victim participating in
sentencing decisions in capital cases is being shaped most directly
by jurists in those states and by the federal courts reviewing
habeas petitions from those states.
The exclusion of victim sentencing opinion testimony is not
simply the consequence of proper state sentencing statutes and
Supreme Court precedent; it is the result of political and economic
events dating from the early common law times. What follows is
an examination of the efforts courts make to rationalize the
exclusion of such testimony and the absurdity that results when
the victims' and the defendants' arguments coincide-when the
victims do not want the defendant to be executed.
B. The Supreme Court Addresses Victim Impact Testimony in
Booth v. Maryland and Payne v. Tennessee
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether
victims were permitted to offer a statement at the penalty stage of
a capital trial in the 1987 decision of Booth v. Maryland.127 In that
case the defendant, John Booth, was convicted by a jury of two
counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery, and one count
of conspiracy to commit robbery.128 He chose to have a jury, rather
than the judge, decide whether he would receive the death
serious crimes. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). In Kennedy, the
Court held that child rape was not punishable by death. Id. at 2644. The Court
further held that any crime against an individual that did not result in the
loss of life was not punishable by death. See id. (explaining that "there is a
distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individuals, even including child rape, on the other.").
123. Haas, supra note 8, at 427-39.
124. According to a Gallop poll, sixty-six percent of Americans surveyed
supported the death penalty in the year 2004. Joseph Carroll, Gallup Poll:
Who Supports the Death Penalty?, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 16, 2004),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/gallup-poll-who-supports-death-penalty.
125. Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 180.
126. State Execution Rates, supra note 107. Most of the states that permit
the death penalty are located in the south and in the west of the United
States. Id. Of the executions that occurred in the United States between 1976
and 2008, the majority occurred in Texas. Id.
127. Booth, 482 U.S. 496, 504.
128. Id. at 498.
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penalty.129

The Maryland sentencing statute in place at the time
required the presentence report to include a description of the
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family; in other
words, it included a victim impact statement. 130 During the
penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor proffered the testimony
of the family members who had contributed to the victim impact
statement contained in the presentence report. 3 1 The defense
counsel moved to suppress all victim impact evidence on the
grounds that it was irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, and
therefore its use would violate Mr. Booth's rights under the Eighth
Amendment. 132 The trial court rejected this motion, stating that
the jury was entitled to consider "any and all evidence which
would bear on the [sentencing decision]."133 The presentence report

contained two types of information. First, there was information
regarding the personal characteristics of the victims and the
emotional impact of the crimes on their family members.134 The
second type of information in the report included the opinions of
the family members about the defendant, the proper sentence to
be imposed, and their characterizations of the crime.135 The jury
recommended that Mr. Booth receive the death penalty.136
The Supreme Court granted Mr. Booth's request for certiorari
to determine whether allowing the jury to consider victim impact
evidence in a capital trial violates the defendant's rights under the
Eighth Amendment.137

In its opinion, the Booth Court first

discussed the general relevance of victim impact statements. The
Court noted that in prior decisions it had required factors to be
considered at sentencing to have some bearing on the defendant's
"personal responsibility and moral guilt."138 The Court also
observed that it had previously concluded that "[t]o do otherwise
would create the risk that a death sentence will be based on
considerations that are 'constitutionally impermissible or totally

129. Id.
130. Id. at 498-99. Although the report is compiled by the Division of Parole
and Probation, the information in the report is based on information supplied
by the victim's family.
131. Id. at 498-500.
132. Id. at 500-01.
133. Id. at 501 (alteration in original). Defense counsel then suggested that
rather than allow the witnesses to testify regarding the impact of the crime,
the prosecutor could read the victim impact statement contained in the
presentence report. The prosecutor agreed to this request, and read the report
to the jury. Id.
134. Id. at 502.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 496.
137. Id. at 501-02.
138. Id. at 502 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
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irrelevant to the sentencing process." 39
In deciding whether evidence concerning the personal
characteristics of the victim and the impact of the murder on the
victim's family members was constitutionally irrelevant, the Court
observed that there was no connection between this evidence and
the "blameworthiness" of the defendant.140 It also observed that
allowing the jury to consider the extent of the grief suffered by the
family members or the regard in which the victim was held by the
community would encourage juries to make life and death
decisions on improper grounds. The Court stated that such
information "does not provide a 'principled way to distinguish
[cases] in which the death penalty [is to be] imposed, from the
many cases in which it [is] not."' 41
As to the portion of the victim impact statement that included
the opinions of the family members as to the character of the
defendant, the crime, and the sentence to be imposed, the Booth
Court concluded that such testimony would serve no other purpose
than to "inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on
42
the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant."
It further noted that "[a]ny decision to impose the death sentence
must 'be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or
143
emotion."'
Four years after issuing the Booth opinion, the Supreme
Court reexamined the constitutionality of victim impact
statements in Payne v. Tennessee.144 There, the Court held that the
use of victim impact statements would not necessarily violate the
Eighth Amendment under all circumstances.14 5 In Payne, the
Court overruled Booth, at least in part, and reopened the door to
testimony by the family members of murder victims during the
penalty phase of the trial concerning the impact of the crime on
their lives.146
In Payne, the victim impact testimony at issue included a
139. Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983)).
140. Id. at 504.
141. Id. at 505-506 (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433).
142. Id. at 508.
143. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)). Included in
the victim opinion evidence were statements that the victims were "butchered
like animals," "animals wouldn't do this," "[t]he murders show the viciousness
of the killers' anger . .. people who did this could [n]ever be rehabilitated. . . ."
Id. In South Carolina v. Gathers, the Court extended the prohibition against
victim impact evidence to include a ban on similar statements made by
prosecutors. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by

Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
144. Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
145. See id. at 825 (holding that "if the State chooses to permit the admission
of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the
Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.").
146. Id. at 825, 827.
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statement by a witness who characterized the grief and emotional
trauma suffered by her grandson, who was three-years-old when
he witnessed the murders of his mother and younger sister. 4 7 The
jury was also informed that the boy had nearly died of a knife
wound inflicted by the defendant during the incident.148 The
witness testified that the boy still cried for his mother and little
sister and did not understand why his mother would not come
home and that he missed his little sister.149 The victim impact
evidence also included extensive statements by the prosecutor who
described the horror experienced by the surviving victim, the love
other family members had for the victims, and the impact of their
losses.150
In a clear departure from Booth, the Payne Court determined
that such testimony was permissible and relevant "as evidence of
the specific harm caused by the defendant."15 1 It also noted that
the harm caused by a crime is normally considered in imposing
sentences in criminal law, regardless
of the relative
blameworthiness of a particular defendant.152 However, the Court
did not open the door to all victim impact testimony. It reiterated
the principle, applicable to all relevant evidence, that if the
probative value of the testimony is outweighed by its prejudicial
effect, the courts must not admit the testimony. 53 Because victim
opinion testimony of the kind rejected in Booth was not introduced
in Payne, the Court did not address whether the opinions of the
victim impact witnesses regarding sentencing were to be allowed.
In a footnote, the Payne Court declared:
Our holding today is limited to the holdings of Booth v. Maryland
and South Carolinav. Gathers that evidence and argument relating
to the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's
family are inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing. Booth also
held that the admission of a victim's family members'
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and
the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. No
evidence of the lattersort was presented at the trial in this case.154

This footnote has become a source of some controversy. Most
courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that Payne
only partially overruled Booth. These courts believe that because
147. Id. at 814-15.
148. Id. at 815.
149. Id. at 814-15.
150. Id. at 815-16.
151. Id. at 827.
152. Id. at 819.
153. Id. at 825 (stating that "[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that
is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for
relief.").
154. Id. at 830 n.2 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the Payne Court did not directly address victim opinion testimony,
the ban on such testimony under Booth remains intact.15 5
After the Supreme Court issued the Payne opinion, many
states revised their sentencing statutes or otherwise enacted
legislation to allow the kind of victim impact evidence addressed in
Payne.156 Even though there is variation among the states as to
the type of evidence that will be allowed in victim impact
statements,15 7 almost all courts will allow victims to testify as to
the harm caused by the crime.158 Victim opinion testimony
regarding the proper sentence to be imposed, however, is another
story.

155. See, e.g., Lynn v. Reinstein, 68 P.3d 412, 417 n.5 (Ariz. 2003)
(discussing the concurring opinions in Payne and concluding that they
supported its interpretation of the scope of the Payne decision). See also Payne,
501 U.S. at 833 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating as to victim opinion
testimony, "As the Court notes in today's decision, we do not reach this issue
as no evidence of this kind was introduced at petitioner's trial."). Referring to
the majority opinion's footnote 2, Justice Souter in his concurring opinion
stated: "This case presents no challenge to the Court's holding in Booth v.
Maryland that a sentencing authority should not receive a third category of
information concerning a victim's family members' characterization of and
opinion about . . . the appropriate sentence." Id. at 835 n.1 (Souter, J.,

concurring).
156. See generally Buckley, supra note 17.
157. This is partially due to the fact that each state has its own sentencing
statute, and therefore whether victim impact testimony offered in a particular
case will be considered relevant and admissible depends on the statute to be
applied and the proffered evidence itself. See also Commonwealth v. Means,
773 A.2d 143, 154-56 (Pa. 2001) (discussing admissibility of victim impact
statements post-Payne under particular death penalty sentencing statutes);
Blivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind. 1994) (disallowing victim impact
testimony by strictly interpreting its sentencing statute to allow only specified
aggravating and mitigating factors); State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 651-52
(Utah 1995), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Timmerman, 218 P.3d
590 (Utah 2009) (recognizing that the victim impact evidence did not violate
the Eighth Amendment under Payne, though the court held that the evidence
was irrelevant under the heightened standard for relevance and probative
value under the state's evidence rules).
158. See generally Homick v. State, 825 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992) (holding the
statements by the prosecutor regarding the negative impact of the murder on
the victim's family permissible under Payne); Means, 773 A.2d at 155-56
(listing the states that allow victim impact evidence "under generalized
considerations of relevancy regarding the circumstances of the crime, proof of
the uniqueness of the victim as an individual life in being and the moral
culpability of the defendant," and concluding that "[t]he jurisdictions that have
considered the issue of victim impact testimony have overwhelmingly chosen
to admit the testimony as relevant in capital sentencing."); Buckley, supra
note 17, § 9[a] (listing cases in which the courts have allowed victim opinion
testimony after Payne).
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C. Victim Opinion Testimony after Payne v. Tennessee
As set forth above, victim impact testimony about the harm
caused by the crime is clearly permitted under Payne, but most
courts have held that Payne only partially overruled Booth,
leaving intact the prohibition against victim opinion testimony.
Furthermore, unlike victim impact testimony, victim opinion
testimony regarding the sentence to be imposed is not directly
relevant to the harm caused by the crime; rather, it is relevant to
the effect the sentence will have on those harmed by the crime.
While this reasoning appears logical, there are two problems with
precluding victim opinion testimony under Payne and Booth.
First, once a jury is permitted to hear emotional impact
testimony from victims, it is nonsense to presume that the jury
will only take the facts presented and simply apply a rational
analysis in an attempt to quantify the amount of suffering caused
by the murder. Thus, the harm the Booth Court sought to avoid by
disallowing both types of impact statements is now allowed under
Payne. In fact, had the Payne Court prohibited victim impact
statements but allowed victim opinion testimony regarding
sentencing, there would be less emotional and inflammatory
testimony during the sentencing stage of the trial than is currently
considered acceptable. This is especially so when the sentencing
opinion testimony consists of a simple statement of opinion, as is
allowed in Oklahoma.159
The second problem with excluding victim opinion testimony
under Booth arises when the victims actually want the defendant
to receive mercy. Courts exclude this type of testimony by
concluding that the defendant's constitutional rights will be
violated because all victim sentencing recommendations are
"constitutionally irrelevant." This reasoning is incorrect; while
recommendations of death may be "constitutionally irrelevant"
under current Supreme Court precedent, recommendations of
mercy should only be judged based on the simple rules of evidence.
When legislatures create sentencing statutes that clearly define
relevant evidence to include victim mercy opinions, such testimony
is, in fact, relevant and should be allowed.

159. Id. The position of the Oklahoma courts makes more sense if, rather
than relying solely on their unique conclusion that Payne overruled Booth in
its entirety, one were to analyze the issue using common sense: closing the
door to sentencing opinion testimony yet allowing impact testimony will not
prevent the juries from relying at least to some extent on emotion and
sympathy for the victims in determining the defendant's sentence.
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When Victims Recommend Death

Two cases from Alabama are typical of the majority of the
cases that have confronted the issue of victim opinion testimony
after Payne when the impact witnesses recommend the death
sentence. In Wimberly v. State, the defendant argued that the
court erred during the sentencing stage of the trial by allowing
certain victim impact testimony by the victim's daughter. 160 The
statement the victim's daughter read to the jury included the
following:
If this convicted murderer is given life in prison, he will have just
that: life.

. .

. At the expense of the State, he could become a college

graduate, a published author, or communicate with others through
the internet. We realize that no matter what your verdict, it will not
bring our family back. But you can allow justice to be served. It is
the desire of myself and my family that Wimberly be given the
sentence that he has handed out: Give him death.16'
In concluding the statement was inadmissible the court
stated: "We find these comments were calculated to incite an
arbitrary response from the jury and that they should have been
excluded."162 In determining that such comments were in violation
of Wimberly's Eighth Amendment rights under Booth,163 the
Wimberly court followed the Alabama Supreme court's opinion of
160. Wimberly v. State, 759 So.2d 568, 572 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). Although
the Alabama Criminal Court of Appeals had already concluded that the trial
court had committed plain error by admitting other evidence at trial, it
decided to address Wimberly's argument concerning the victim impact
testimony under a plain error standard of review, recognizing that the same
issue might arise during the sentencing stage of the case on retrial. See

generally id.
161. Id. at 573 (emphasis added). The defense counsel never objected to
these comments, and thus, the court reviewed the admission of these

statements for plain error. Id. Under Alabama rules of appellate procedure,
plain error is defined as "error which, when examined in the context of the
entire case, is so obvious that failure to notice it would seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
162. Id. at 574 (citing Barbour, 673 So.2d at 469). The Wimberly court noted
that had it not already decided to reverse the case for a new trial, it would
have set aside the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. In
determining that the comments were inadmissible as they were "calculated to
incite an arbitrary response from the jury," the Wimberly court also relied on
the Alabama case of Barbour v. State. Id. In Barbour, however, the victims'
brother had written a letter requesting that the defendant not be put to death.
Barbour,673 So.2d at 468.
163. Wimberly, 759 So.2d at 572 (quoting Ex parte McWilliams, 640 P.2d at
1017). The Wimberly court stated: "The Alabama Supreme Court has held that
a defendant's Eighth Amendment rights were violated if a sentencer
considered those portions of a victim impact statement wherein the 'victim's
family members offered their characterizations or opinions of the defendant,
the crime, or the appropriate punishment."' Id.
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Ex parte McWilliams. 164
In Ex parte McWilliams, the Alabama Supreme

Court
addressed the defendant's argument that victim opinions
recommending the death sentence were in violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights. 165 The court agreed.166 It concluded that if the
trial court had considered these when it made the decision to
sentence McWilliams to death, it would have violated his
constitutional rights.16 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court
observed the "portion of Booth that proscribed the trial court's
consideration of that type of statement was
Payne."68

. . .

left intact by

The minority position taken by the Oklahoma courts dealing
with the Payne and Booth opinions is exemplified in an often cited
case, Conover v. State.169 In Conover, the state presented three

witnesses who read victim impact statements to the jury during
the penalty phase of the trial.170 The witnesses each recommended
the death sentence, which was allowed under Oklahoma
statutes.171 Mr. Conover argued this testimony rendered his death
sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.172 The
Conover court summarily dealt with the issue by declaring that
Payne had implicitly overruled Booth's prohibition on victim

164. Id.
165. Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So.2d at 1016-17. After the jury
recommended the death penalty, the trial court reviewed the pre-sentencing
report prior to a statutorily required final sentencing hearing. Id. at 1017.
Included in the pre-sentence report were statements that were written by the
family members of the victims. Id. In addition to information concerning the
victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family, the report also
contained statements that characterized the defendant, the crime and the
appropriate sentence. Id. The family members had recommended that the
death sentence be imposed. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. The court affirmed in part and remanded the case to the court of
appeals for the trial judge to determine whether he had relied on the improper
portions of the victim impact statement in making the decision to execute Mr.
McWilliams. Id. at 1017, 1024.
169. Conover, 933 P.2d at 919-20 (stating that "the Payne opinion
specifically addressed victim impact evidence relating to the personal
characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the
victim's family. Victim impact evidence relating to the characterization of the
homicide and the witnesses' opinion of the appropriate sentence was not an
issue. However, in overruling the prior decision of Booth v. Maryland, and its
prohibition of victim impact evidence, Payne also implicitly overruled that
portion of Booth regarding characterizations of the defendant and opinions of
the sentence. Therefore, contrary to Appellant's argument, Payne and not
Booth, is the controlling case on this issue." (citations omitted)).
170. Id. at 918.
171. Id. at 918 n.6.
172. Id.
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opinion testimony.173
The Conover court then observed that the Oklahoma
legislature had specifically allowed the admission of victim impact
evidence by enacting legislation one year following Payne.174
The sentencing statute clearly defined permissible victim
impact testimony to include victim impact testimony in the form of
"the witness's opinion of a recommended sentence as information."
The court quoted the statutory definition of admissible victim
impact testimony as follows:
"Victim impact statements" means information about the financial,
emotional, psychological, and physical effects of a violent crime on
each victim and members of their immediate family, or person
designated by the victim or by family members of the victim, and
includes information about the victim, circumstances surrounding
the crime, the manner in which the crime was perpetrated, and the
175

witness's opinion of a recommended sentence.

Although the Conover court concluded that the provisions of
the statute that allowed for witnesses' sentencing opinions did not
violate the Eighth Amendment,17 6 it also observed that there were
limits to the use of victim opinion testimony under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.177 It stated that
such evidence might be inadmissible if it is "so unduly prejudicial
that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair." 178 The court
further stated that when the witnesses testify that the defendant
"deserves death," such statements would be viewed with a
"heightened degree of scrutiny."17 9 It further stated that opinions
regarding the sentence to be imposed "should be limited to a
simple statement of the recommended sentence without
amplification. Any statements outside those parameters will be
examined in context to determine if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."18 0 In
applying this test to the victim impact statements, the court held
that the witnesses' statements regarding sentencing were properly

173. Id. at 920-21 (noting that the court had dealt with this issue in
Ledbetter, 933 P.2d at 891, in which it held that victim opinion testimony
recommending the death penalty was permissible both under the Eighth
Amendment and Oklahoma law, and it was not unduly prejudicial to the
defendant).
174. Id. at 920 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 §§ 984, 984.1, 991a(D) (1992);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 §701.10(C) (1991)).
175. Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 984(1) (1992) (emphasis added)).
176. Id. at 920.
177. Id. at 920-21.
178. Id. at 920 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825). The required balancing test
is set forth by Oklahoma statute, as noted by the Conover court, at OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12 § 2403 (1991). Id.
179. Id. at 921 (citing Ledbetter, 933 P.2d at 891).
180. Id.
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admitted. 8 1
Since Conover, Oklahoma courts have continued to analyze
victim opinion statements under Oklahoma law. The courts have
applied the tests set forth in Conover and have rarely concluded
that the sentencing recommendations were too prejudicial to be
allowed. 8 2 Although defendants have petitioned the Supreme
Court many times to decide whether the Oklahoma statutory
scheme that allows victims to recommend the death penalty
violates the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
defendants, and to clarify the extent to which Payne overruled
Booth, the Court has declined to speak on these matters.183

181. The court concluded that some of the statements failed the test, being
more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 920. The victim impact testimony
included much emotional testimony, including a statement that the victim had
been "butchered like an animal." Id. Relying on Payne for guidance, the court
concluded this statement was "inflammatory" and "designed to invoke an
emotional response by the jury," and that these statements were inadmissible
because they were "emotionally charged personal opinions which are more
prejudicial than probative." Id.
182. See, e.g., Welch v. State, 2 P.3d 356, 374 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000)
(holding that the victims' sentence recommendations, which were for death,
were relevant and admissible, and not outweighed by any prejudicial effect
because they were given "as a straight-forward, concise response to a question
asking what the recommendation is; or a short statement of recommendation
in a written statement without amplification."). But see Malone v. State, 168
P.3d 185, 209 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (concluding that it was plain error in
violation of Payne and the Fourteenth Amendment for the judge to permit a
victim to beg the jury to sentence the defendant to death. There, the victim
asked the jury to show no mercy, and invoked the Bible to suggest a religious
obligation to sentence the defendant to death); Hain v. State, 919 P.2d 1130,
1144 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that victim's mother's statement that
she wished her son "could have died a gentle death, as the family dog had
experienced who was given a lethal injection . . . ." was impermissible under
Section 984(1) as it was a "purely emotional plea which is not statutorily
permitted.").
183. In Hain, although the court held the testimony of the victim's father
that "death was the only appropriate punishment" was permissible under
Oklahoma law, it noted that such evidence might not be found constitutional
by the Supreme Court under Payne. Hain, 919 P.2d at 1144 n.3. In 2002, the
case went to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on
appeal from the district court's denial of Mr. Hain's habeas corpus petition.
Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2002). There, Hain argued once again
that the impact testimony that included sentencing opinions was admitted in
violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 1238. The Tenth Circuit agreed
with Hain and held that such testimony was inadmissible under the portion of
Booth left intact by Payne. Id. at 1239. However, although the court held the
testimony violated Hain's Eighth Amendment rights, it ultimately upheld the
death sentence. Id. at 1240. The court determined the error was harmless in
light of all the evidence supporting the death sentence. Id. at 1239-40.
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When Victims Recommend Life

After the Supreme Court issued the decision in Payne, a
number of courts have wrestled with the comparatively rare
situation where the victims, who might or might not give victim
impact evidence, also want to inform the jury that they do not
want the defendant to be executed. A leading case addressing this
issue is the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
case of Robison v. Maynard (Robison 1).184
Olan Randle Robison was convicted of three counts of first
degree murder by an Oklahoma jury.18 5 The jury also
recommended the death penalty for Mr. Robison. 186 Prior to the
sentencing stage of the trial, the trial court held an en camera
discussion with the prosecutor and the defense attorney. 187 The
district attorney asked the court for an order that would instruct
the victim impact witnesses not to "express any kind of an opinion,
to be asked any kind of question or express any kind of opinion as
to whether or not they feel the death penalty should be
imposed." 188 The defense counsel responded that he planned to call
certain victim impact witnesses who had "expressed to me a desire
to ask the jury not to impose the death penalty in this case."189
Counsel for Mr. Robison argued that this would be proper
testimony in mitigation under the 1978 Supreme Court case of
Lockett v. Ohio.190 However, the trial court refused his request on
the grounds that "allowing such testimony would be no more
proper than allowing the State to put on testimony that the
penalty should be invoked." 191
After exhausting his appeals in the Oklahoma courts, 192
Robison filed a habeas corpus petition in the appropriate federal
district court. 193 There, he argued that the Oklahoma trial court
erred during the penalty phase of the trial and deprived him of his
right to due process when it refused to allow the victim impact
184. This case first came to the Tenth Circuit for a review of the denial of
Mr. Robison's habeas petition. Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir.
1987), overruled on other grounds by Ramano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156 (10th
Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Robison 1]. At this time, the Supreme Court had not
issued the Payne decision, and Booth was the controlling Supreme Court
authority regarding all manner of victim impact testimony. Also, the
Oklahoma legislature had not yet enacted its sentencing statute that
specifically allowed victims to state their opinions regarding sentencing.
185. Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); Robison
I, 829 F.2d at 1502.
186. Robison 1, 829 F.2d at 1503.
187. Id. at 1503-04.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1504.
190. Id. (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
191. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
192. Id. at 1502 n.1.
193. Id. at 1502.
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witnesses to testify that they opposed the death penalty. 194 The
district court, however, found no error, and Robison filed an appeal
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. There,
Robison argued that the testimony should have been allowed
under the Oklahoma sentencing statute that permitted the
presentation of "any mitigating circumstances" during the
sentencing phase of trial.19 5 Robison contended that the proffered
testimony was a proper mitigating circumstance because
retaliation is a justification for imposition of the death penalty,
6
and in his case the victim's family did not desire retaliation.19
However, the Tenth Circuit held that such evidence would
interfere with the jury's ability to determine the appropriate
sentence, and therefore the evidence could not be allowed under
Booth v. Maryland.97 According to the Robison I panel, use of the
proffered victim opinion testimony might encourage the jury to
make an arbitrary decision.198 It stated:
The jury must be provided with evidence that will lead it to
principled determination without any hint of arbitrariness. We

conclude the testimony offered by the defense in this instance was
calculated to incite arbitrary response, thus it was properly excluded
199

After the Tenth Circuit issued the Robison I opinion, the

Supreme Court decided Payne v. Tennessee.200 Because the
decision in Robison I relied on Booth, the Tenth Circuit granted
Mr. Robison's request for a rehearing. 201 However, in Robison II,
Mr. Robison again failed to persuade the court that the trial court
should have admitted the evidence of the victim's opposition to the
death penalty.
In Robison II, the court observed that Payne did not expand
the admissible universe of mitigating evidence. 202 The court
distinguished Payne from the case before it, finding that although

194. Id. at 1504-05.
195. Id. at 1504 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (1976)). In support of
this argument, Robison relied upon Lockett, 438 U.S. 586. In Lockett, the
Court held that a defendant in a capital case has a constitutional right to
present "any aspect of [his] character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
196. Robison I, 829 F.2d at 1504.
197. Id. at 1505. In the later Robison v. Maynard, the court denied that it
had relied on Booth in deciding that the proffered testimony was irrelevant,
but it recognized that its holding was consistent with Booth. Robison v.
Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Robison I].
198. Robison I, 829 F.2d at 1505-06.
199. Id. at 1505.
200. Payne, 501 U.S. 808.
201. Robison II, 943 F.2d at 1216.
202. Id. at 1217.
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Payne permitted victim testimony about the impact of the crime on
the victim's family, Payne did not permit juries to consider how the
imposition of the death penalty on the defendant would impact the
victim's family. 203 The court concluded that the victim opinion
testimony was irrelevant and thus inadmissible in the sentencing
phase because it did not "relate to the harm caused by the
defendant."204 As a result, Robison was executed by lethal injection
in Oklahoma on March 13, 1992.205 Since the Robison decisions, a
number of other courts have denied requests to allow victims to
inform the jury that they do not want the defendant to be
executed. 206 In State v. Glassel, the Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow one of the victims to
testify that she did not want Mr. Glassel executed, even though
she had given tearful victim impact testimony during the penalty
phase of the trial.207 In that case, the defendant had been
convicted of two counts of premeditated first degree murder and
thirty counts of attempted first degree murder. 208 After the jury
returned its guilty verdicts, the trial court allowed three people to
give victim impact testimony regarding the murder of Nila Lynn.
The court allowed Ms. Lynn's two daughters and her husband,
Duane Lynn, to testify. All the witnesses cried throughout their
testimony.
Duane Lynn testified that he had been married to Ms. Lynn
for nearly fifty years. He also described how their children had
been saving money for an anniversary party for them but had used
that money to buy a casket instead. 209 He told of his love for his
wife, how he missed her, and that she had begged him to help her
as she lay dying. 210 He also showed the jury twenty-five pictures of
Nina and their family. 211 However, in spite of his suffering, Mr.
Lynn did not want the jury to impose the death penalty. 212
Understandably, Glassel wanted the jury to hear that Mr.
Lynn, who had been crying on the stand and describing extreme
emotional trauma that he had suffered, did not want the jury to
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1218.
205. See United States of America: Death Penalty Developments in 1992,
AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=04DF4D64BC
FFF0C6802569A600602F8D&lang-e (last visited Mar. 19, 2011) (providing
statistics regarding the death penalty in the United States).
206. See, e.g., Buckley, supra note 17 (listing cases where the victim did not
want the defendant to be put to death).
207. Glassel, 116 P.3d at 1215.
208. Id. at 1201. The killings occurred when Glassel walked into a building
were his former home owners' association representatives were meeting and
opened fire on the group. Id.
209. Id. at 1213.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1214-15.
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recommend that he be executed. He argued that although the
Eighth Amendment bars a victim from recommending a death
sentence when the defendant objects to the testimony, it "cannot
bar a recommendation of leniency when the defendant
affirmatively wishes the jury to hear it" and "rights under the
Eighth Amendment are the defendant's to raise or waive, not for
the trial court to impose against his will."2 13
Sitting en banc, the Arizona Supreme Court began its
analysis of whether the mercy opinion testimony was relevant and
therefore admissible "turns on the question of whether the
recommendation 'creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that
jurors may impose a death sentence based upon impermissible
arbitrary and emotional factors."' 214 The court further stated that
it had previously held in two prior cases, "victims' opinions about
what sentence should be imposed in a capital case are
constitutionally irrelevant."215 The court failed to make any
distinction between statements recommending the death penalty,
and those calling for mercy. It stated:
Although here it is a defendant who argues that a victim's
recommendation of leniency should be admitted, the same reasoning

applies. What makes [a] victim['s] statements relevant is the
evidence of the impact of the crime. Thus, a victim's
recommendation of what sentence should be imposed in a capital
case, whether for or against the death penalty, is simply not
relevant.216

In denying Glassel's appeal, the court also noted that it had
previously determined that Mr. Lynn could not give his
recommendation of a life sentence because "the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a victim from making a sentencing
recommendation to the jury in a capital case." 217
In that case, Mr. Lynn had brought a special action against
the trial court after it denied his request to tell the jury that he did
not want Glassel to be executed. 218 The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision, and Lynn was equally unsuccessful in his
appeal to the Supreme Court of Arizona. 219 There, Lynn argued
that he was entitled to express his opinion on the proper sentence
to be imposed under the Arizona Victims' Bill of Rights. 220 The
Victims' Bill of Rights is incorporated into the Arizona
Constitution, and mandates that any victim of a crime has the
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 1215 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1214 (quoting Lynn, 68 P.3d at 416 n.5).
Id. at 1215 (emphasis added).
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Lynn, 68 P.3d at 414).
See generally Lynn, 68 P.3d 412.
Id. at 418.
See generally Lynn, 68 P.3d 412.
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221
right to "be heard at any proceeding involving . . . sentencing."
This right is also enshrined in the Arizona Revised Statutes, which
provide the victims of crime the right to "address the court"

regarding "opinions that concern . . . the sentence . . . at any

sentencing
or
presentencing,
mitigation,
aggravation,
proceeding." 222
Even though these rights were to be "liberally construed" and
nothing in the Victims' Bill of Rights, or the relevant statutory
provisions, limited these rights to victims testifying in non-capital
cases, the Arizona Supreme Court did not analyze Mr. Lynn's
rights under the Arizona Constitution or under the relevant
provisions of the Arizona Revised Statutes. 223 Instead, the court
emphasized footnote two of the Payne opinion and characterized
the holding as "not disturb[ing] its earlier determination that
victim sentencing opinions were not only irrelevant in capital
sentencing proceedings, but might well be prejudicial."224 In a
footnote to its own opinion, the Lynn court stated:
The 'relevance' referred to in Booth differs from that set forth in the
state rules of evidence. It is a constitutional concept that considers
whether information that may bear upon the capital sentencing
decision creates a constitutionally inacceptable risk that jurors may
impose a death sentence based upon impermissible arbitrary and
emotional factors.225

Finally, the Lynn court concluded that any victim statements
that are not related to the harm caused by the defendant's crime
226
"violate the Eighth Amendment, and are therefore prohibited."
It further concluded that "[v]ictims' recommendations to the jury

regarding the appropriate sentence a capital defendant should
receive are not constitutionally relevant to the harm caused by the
defendant's criminal acts or to the defendant's blameworthiness or

221. Id. at 414 (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(4); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-

4426(A), (B) (2001)).
222. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT § 13-4418 (2001)).

223. Id. at 415. Instead, the court began its analysis by citing the wellknown line from Booth v. Maryland to support its decision to treat capital
cases differently from all other cases covered by the Victims' Rights Act. Id. It
stated: "[D]eath is a 'punishment different from all other sanctions,' and that
therefore the considerations that inform the sentencing decision may be
different from those that apply to other punishments." Id. at 415 (quoting
Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.1 2). After reviewing Booth and Payne, the court
concluded that, contrary to Mr. Lynn's argument, Payne had not overruled all
barriers to the admissibility of victim opinion testimony, but rather had left
intact "that portion of Booth that the Court itself has characterized as
prohibiting victims from recommending a sentence in a capital case." Id. at
416.
224. Id. at 417.
225. Id. at 417 n.5.
226. Id. at 417.
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culpability." 227
III. WHEN VICTIMS' AND DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS COINCIDE: THE
DIFFICULTY OF JUSTIFYING THE SUPPRESSION OF VICTIMS'
CALLS FOR LENIENCY

Even assuming the Payne court only partially overruled
Booth, leaving intact its holding that victim opinion testimony
violates the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights, refusing to
admit testimony that the victims do not want the death penalty
imposed makes no sense under a close reading of the relevant
Supreme Court precedent. Under a sensible reading of Booth,
sentencing opinion testimony would only be constitutionally
irrelevant if the victim calls for the death penalty--even though
the harm sought to be avoided in Booth is already accomplished by
allowing victim impact evidence. However, if the victims call for
mercy, the evidence should be judged under a simple application of
the state rules of evidence and sentencing statutes.
When it addressed victim opinion testimony, the Booth Court
stated that such testimony would serve no other purpose than to
"inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the
relevant evidence concerning the crime and defendant." 228
However, it is important to note that the harm sought to be
avoided from such inflammatory and irrelevant testimony was the
possibility that such testimony might entice the jury "to impose
the death sentence based on caprice or emotion" rather than on
reason. 229 Even though victim impact evidence consisting of victim
opinions concerning the death penalty would not go to the
"blameworthiness" of the defendant, interpreting that language to
mean that asking for leniency would be constitutionally
irrelevant-as courts suggested in Robison, Glassel, and Lynn-is
absurd. Lurking behind the courts' misunderstanding of the issue
is a deeply-rooted belief that homicide must be classified, and
considered for every purpose, as a crime against the state rather
than an individual wrong. This leads to the incorrect conclusion
that the effect of the sentence imposed on the victims' family
members is of no importance whatsoever.
Indeed, the problem runs even deeper. This mistaken belief
leads to the implicit conclusion that victim opinion testimony as to
the proper sentence to be imposed is inherently irrelevant, and
therefore constitutionally irrelevant, despite the existence of
statutory schemes that clearly define such testimony as relevant
and admissible. If such testimony is believed to be inherently
irrelevant as a matter of American jurisprudence, then the courts
227. Id.
228. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508.
229. Id.
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that have applied the "constitutional relevance" analysis set forth
in Booth can be more easily understood. A more careful
examination of certain statements made by the courts in the cases
described above, in which victims have been denied the right to
call for leniency, will now be discussed to shed light on this point.
Interestingly, the Robison I court supported its decision by
stating that the testimony might encourage the jury to make an
arbitrary decision by declining to impose the death penalty in
violation of the Eighth Amendment "[b]ecause the offense was
committed not against the victim but against the community as a
whole, in Oklahoma only the community, speaking through the
jury, has the right to determine what punishment should be
administered. 230
The highlighted language is a reiteration of the belief
stemming from mediaeval times that the victims are to be
removed from all sentencing determinations and deserve no
special status as members of the community especially affected by
the crime. 231 The idea that murder is a crime against the state is of
course legal fiction, even if supported by public policy designed to
protect society as a whole from violent crimes such as murder. 232
The Robison I court also misinterpreted Booth by ignoring the
Booth Court's underlying concern that victim opinion testimony
might incite the jury to make an arbitrary decision "to impose the
death sentence." 233 The Robison I court simply stated that allowing
the victims to testify that they did not want the death penalty to
be imposed "is calculated to incite an arbitrary response and is
properly excluded." 234
Similarly, in Lynn and Glassel, even though the court was
dealing with the possibility that the jury might be influenced to
withhold the death penalty if Mr. Lynn were to testify, the court
analyzed the language from Booth without regard to the fact that
230. Robison I, 829 F.3d at 1505 (emphasis added). But see Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (stating that although "jury sentencing in a
capital case can perform an important societal function. . . jury sentencing is
[not] constitutionally required," and that "judicial sentencing should lead, if
anything, to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level
of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing
than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose sentences similar to those
imposed in analogous cases." (citations omitted)).
231. This idea is not, of course, emphasized by those courts that have dealt
with the importance of sharing with the jury the impact on the individuals
closest to the defendant.
232. Even though murder is considered an offense against the state and
juries have the power to recommend life in prison or death as the punishment
for this crime, victims should not be prevented from at least advising the jury
as to the punishment they believe is warranted. The jury still decides, guided
by a host of factors.
233. Booth, 482 U.S. at 508 (emphasis added).
234. Robison I, 829 F.2d at 1505 (emphasis added).
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the Booth Court was dealing with victim opinion testimony in
favor of the death penalty. The Lynn court concluded that victim
opinion testimony was "not only irrelevant in capital proceedings,
but might well be prejudicial."235 Ironically, the Lynn court also
stated that in a capital case a court must assess whether the
evidence given that "may bear upon the capital sentencing
decision creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk [violative of
the Eighth Amendment] that the jurors may impose a death
sentence based on impermissible arbitrary and emotional
factors." 236 Following its reasoning in Lynn, the Glassel court
determined that the evidence that the victims did not want the
death penalty imposed was properly excluded because it was
"constitutionally irrelevant" as it did not fall into the category of
victim impact testimony, which was clearly sanctioned by the
Payne Court. 237 It refused to distinguish victim opinion testimony
calling for leniency from victim testimony calling for death.
Without further explanation, the Glassel court simply stated that
"the same reasoning" applies to both categories of testimony, and
concluded that victim opinion testimony calling for leniency is
"simply irrelevant."238

Decisions such as Robison, Glassel, and Lynn that interpret
the language of Booth as banning all manner of victim opinion
testimony in sentencing under the Eighth Amendment are
incorrect. 23 9 The Eighth Amendment states in pertinent part:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."240 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the cruel and unusual language of the
Eighth Amendment to include punishments that are inflicted
based on arbitrary considerations. 241 It is not concerned with
on arbitrary
based
withheld
that are
punishments
considerations-at least in those cases where the punishment is

235. Lynn, 68 P.3d at 417.
236. Id. at 417 n.5.
237. Glassel, 116 P.3d at 1215.
238. Id.

239. See Stephen P. Garvey, As the Gentle Rain From Heaven: Mercy in
Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1996) (criticizing the death

selection stage of a capital trial and arguing that the penalty phase should be
restructured to allow for mercy opinions); Brian L. Vander Pol, Note,
Relevance and Reconciliation:A ProposalRegarding the Admissibility of Mercy
Opinions in Capital Sentencing, 88 IOwA L. REV. 707 (2003) (arguing that
courts incorrectly apply the rules of evidence to mercy opinions in capital
cases, and proposing a model definition of a mercy opinion).
240. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
241. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (holding that a
statutory sentencing scheme that allows for the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty is in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment).
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withheld from the particular defendant at issue. 242 The Supreme
Court has also determined that a statutory scheme is not arbitrary
and capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment if it allows
the prosecutor discretion, allows the jury to convict of a lesser
offense to avoid the death penalty, or allows for the possibility of
commutation. 243 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
deprivation of "life . . . without due process of law." 244 It does not
prohibit leniency that would preserve the life of the defendant
without due process of law. 24 5 Nor can we possibly imagine the
state succeeding in an argument that a grant of clemency,
commutation of sentence, or pardon violates the defendant's
constitutional rights, although those decisions are often based on
the exercise of expansive discretion on the part of the governor,
judge, or president.
The purpose of these clauses is to protect the persons accused
of committing crimes (or wrongs) from arbitrary process or
excessive punishment. They should not be used or interpreted to
limit the accused's rights to present evidence for fear of violation of
the constitutional rights of that same accused individual, at least
when such evidence is made explicitly relevant under state
statutory schemes and constitutional amendments. The difficulty
courts have had, to date, in extending the victims the opportunity
to tell the jury that they do not want the death penalty to be
imposed stems from a faulty interpretation of the language of
Booth, as well as a no-longer-defensible notion that homicide is,
and should be, considered strictly a crime against the state rather
than against an individual for all purposes. For these reasons, and
as will be discussed below, such testimony should not be
considered "constitutionally irrelevant" under either our historical
criminal jurisprudence or current sensibilities.
A.

The Victims'Rights and Restorative Justice Movements

In his dissent in the Booth case, Justice Scalia took issue with
the majority's belief that in a death penalty case the punishment
should be decided based solely on evidence "relevant to the
defendants' personal responsibility and moral guilt."246 He stated

242. A scheme that imposes or withholds punishment based on arbitrary
factors may be unconstitutional when challenged by a defendant who claims
his rights were violated by the imposition of punishment under such a system.

See generally id.
243. Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 254.

244. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
245. Of course, if a statutory scheme allowed for the unbridled discretion of
prosecutors or sentencers to withhold or impose the death penalty without the
application of any standards, the application of the death penalty under such a
scheme would be constitutionally impermissible.
246. Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that the "personal responsibility" of the defendant was connected
to the amount of harm caused, 247 and the principle that "the
imposition of capital punishment is to be determined solely on the
basis of moral guilt does not exist, neither in the text of the
Constitution, nor in the historic practices of our society . . . ."248
Justice Scalia then went on to support his reasoning by
recognizing the concerns expressed by the victims' rights
movement. 249 Rather than emphasizing the crime of murder as a
crime against society as a whole, he recognized the personal
suffering of the family members of the victims, which he believed
should play a role in the jury's determination as to whether or not
the defendant deserves the death penalty.250
The victims' rights movement has emerged in the United
States as a grassroots movement over the past thirty years. This is
the movement to which Justice Scalia referred in his dissent in
Booth that seeks to empower victims. 251 In the beginning, those in
the movement were reacting to the way victims perceived their
treatment in the criminal justice system. 252 Some victims of crime
believed that the rights of the accused and the convicted were
taken more seriously than the rights of their victims. These
victims of crime felt marginalized, used by the prosecution, and
excluded from all decision-making regarding the trial, sentence,
and possible later parole of the perpetrator of the crime. In an
effort to have their injuries recognized in addition to any injury
suffered by the community due to the crime, 253 the victims' rights
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 520.
250. Id. Justice Scalia wrote: "Recent years have seen an outpouring of
popular concern for what has become to be known as 'victims' rights'-a
phrase that describes what its proponents feel is the failure of courts and
justices to take account . . . the amount of harm caused to innocent members of
society . . . . [W]ith no one to lay before the sentencing authority the full

reality of human suffering the defendant has produced-which (and not moral
guilt alone) is one of the reasons society deems his act worthy of the prescribed
penalty .... There is nothing in the Constitution that dictates the answer ...
it seems to me not remotely unconstitutional to permit both the pros and the
cons in the particular case to be heard." Id. (emphasis in original).
251. See id. (describing an "outpouring of popular concern for what has come
to be known as 'victims' rights"').
252. See The Honorable Jon Kyl, et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The
Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila
Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 581, 583 (2005)
(discussing the history of the victims' rights movement leading to the federal
legislation of victims' rights and increasing legislation designed to protect
victims' rights).
253. See id. (stating that "[b]elieving that crimes are committed against
individuals just as much as they are against the community, the crime victims'
rights movement has sought to guarantee rights to crime victims through the
state and federal legislative process.").
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advocates began to pressure state legislatures to enact victim
friendly laws. 254 For example, some states gave victims the right to
know when and where parole hearings were to be held, and the
right to testify at those hearings. Some in the victims' rights
movement began to argue that victims should be allowed to have a
voice in the sentencing. In capital cases, some advocates wanted to
be allowed to describe to the jury in detail how the crime had
affected them and their families and to describe the positive
characteristics of the victim, as well as their opinions of the
defendant, the crime, and the proper sentence to be imposed. 255
This call for victim impact statements, including opinions
about the proper penalty, has been based on an assumption that
the need for vengeance is a proper instinct for victims. As Justice
Scalia stated in his dissent in Booth, "perhaps these sentiments do
not sufficiently temper justice with mercy." 256 In order to satisfy
this need, so the argument goes, the victims should be allowed to
vent their emotions and their desire for vengeance. The problem
with this notion is that the jury might be encouraged to execute
the defendant out of sympathy for the victim's family. This was
the circumstance that was addressed by the Supreme Court in
Booth and held to violate the defendants' Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.257

Although sharing the goal of the victims' rights movement to
empower the victims of crime, those in the restorative justice

movement view crime as something that affects a community of
actors. 258 Their goal is to facilitate healing and reduce crime by
creating or repairing personal relationships among those affected
by the crime. 259 In addition, psychological studies have shown that
simply exacting vengeance is not necessarily the best means of
recovery for victims of crime and their families. 260 Having the
opportunity to forgive the defendant by advocating for mercy in
the penalty phase might better facilitate closure and healing. 261
Furthermore, many individuals are opposed to the death penalty

for personal, political, philosophical, or religious reasons. In
instances where the victim's relatives hold strongly felt anti-death
penalty sentiments, the imposition of such a sentence may
254. See Henderson, supra note 6, at 938 (discussing the California Victim's
Bill of Rights).
255. See id. at 996-98 (discussing victims' desire for vengeance).
256. Booth, 482 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. See id. at 508 (stating that the decision to impose the death sentence
must be based on reason rather than emotion).
258. CLIFFORD K. DORNE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
INTRODUCTION 3-4 (Pearson Prentice Hall 2008).
259. U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
PROGRAMMES 5-7 (United Nations 2006).

260. Henderson, supra note 6, at 956-65.
261. Id. at 998.
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actually increase their mental anguish. 262 Where the victim is
killed by a family member, the negative consequences of the death
penalty on the rest of the family are readily apparent.
Because reforms are already taking place, both within courts
and legislatures, in order to reintegrate the victims formally into
the sentencing of criminal defendants, 263 legislation that provides
an opportunity for victims to express their opinions on the proper
sentence to be imposed in a capital case should be considered
legitimate and constitutional, especially if the victims call for
mercy and there is no possibility the constitutional rights of the
defendant will be harmed by the testimony. It is thus time to
reexamine the role of the victim in capital cases to allow victim
opinion testimony regarding sentencing. If one looks at early
Roman law, early English common law, and religious and secular
theories regarding the death penalty, and then draws upon
sensible ideas from Islamic law, it becomes clear that it is time to
swing the historical pendulum back ever so slightly to allow
victims to make a simple statement of sentencing preference at a
capital trial.
B. Victim Opinion Testimony and Western Theories
Supporting the Death Penalty
The justification of punishment for criminal behavior is a
topic that intrigues thinkers in many fields. Philosophers,
novelists, playwrights, criminologists, sociologists, jurists,
theologians, and others have taken an interest in the subject. In
the West, punishment for crime is justified either by reference to
religious texts or under one of several secular theories. However,
as discussed above, the death penalty has been abolished in most
nation states, and the crimes punishable by death in the United
States have been greatly reduced. Even as the crimes punishable
by death dwindle, the general justifications for punishment of
crime remain constant and are used in death penalty cases in the
United States, either to support or to argue against the
punishment. 264
262. See generally RACHEL KING, DON'T KILL IN OUR NAMES: FAMILIES OF
MURDER VICTIMS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (Rutgers Univ.
Press 2003); MURDER
VICTims'
FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION,
http://www.mvfr.org/?page-id=3 (last visited on Mar. 19, 2011).
263. Di Bella, supra note 6, at 116-17.
264. See, e.g., Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1132, 1141-44 (Utah 2010)
(describing the defendant's argument that his execution would constitute cruel
and unusual punishment since he had been on death row for twenty-five years
and "the two primary purposes of punishment are deterrence and retribution,
his execution would serve neither purpose."); Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d
691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (recognizing that such claims based on "the mere passage
of time" have been rejected by the courts that have considered them on the
merits).
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In several cases in the United States, defendants have argued
that because the death penalty is justified based on a concept of
retribution, when the victims do not want the death penalty to be
imposed, the purpose of the punishment is lessened and such
testimony should be considered by the jury as mitigating evidence.
Others have argued that when the family members of the victim
do not want the defendant to be executed, the purpose of the
punishment ceases to exist and therefore execution would be
excessive punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
retribution concept, while expressed in secular terms, is rooted in
the West in the religious idea of an "eye for an eye" or a "life for a
life," also known as the lex talionis. The secular and religious
theories supporting the death penalty and their relation to the
victims' lack of control over sentencing, even when the victims call
for mercy, will be discussed in this section of the Article.

1. Victim Opinion Testimony and Secular Theories of
Punishment
There are four main secular justifications typically offered for
criminal punishment. These are: incapacitation, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution. 265 Incapacitation theory rests on
the notion that inflicting a punishment that prevents a criminal
from committing further crime protects society. 266 The deterrence
theory differs from the incapacitation theory in that, rather than
focusing on the general safety of society that may result from the
incapacitation of the criminal after a crime has been committed, it
focuses instead on punishment. 267 Deterrence theory assumes
265. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
(Hill & Wang 1973) (defining retribution, rehabilitation,
incapacitation, and deterrence). See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,
418 (discussing deterrence, rehabilitations and retribution as the main
justifications for the punishment of crime); Henderson, supra note 6, at
987-88 (describing the four main justifications for criminal punishment and
analyzing whether each theory supports victim participation in sentencing).
266. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 58
(Stanford Univ. Press 1968) (explaining and comparing the rehabilitation and
incapacitation theories). When an offender is convicted and sentenced to a
term of incarceration-or some lesser penalty-his or her identity is
publicized. This is supposed to put the community on notice of potentially
dangerous individuals, and therefore reduce their ability to commit future
crimes.
267. See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 3-7 (Univ. of
Mich. Press 1974) (discussing the concept of punishment and prevention);
WITHOUT ORDER 106

PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS,
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 4 (Nat'l Acad. of Sci.

1978) (showing that research found that the effects of deterrence were shown
by an inverse relationship between sanction levels and crime rates).
Deterrence theory assumes criminals are rational and will weigh the
possibility of punishment against other factors prior to committing crimes. Id.
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potential wrongdoers will be deterred from committing crime as a
result of seeing criminals punished. 26 8 Under rehabilitation theory,
criminals are to be rehabilitated by state-imposed intervention. 269
Unlike the other theories discussed, the retribution theory does
not aim to reduce the incidence of crime in society or rehabilitate
the criminal. Rather, the goal of the retribution theory is to avenge
the wrong. 270
Applying these theories to capital punishment, only the
deterrence and retribution theories potentially support an
execution. Obviously, the aim of an execution is not to rehabilitate
the offender. Although incapacitation is surely accomplished by
putting a person to death, it can be argued that a life sentence
would also accomplish the goals of the incapacitation theory. As to
the deterrence theory, many in support of capital punishment
argue that the death penalty deters crime. 27' However, studies
have revealed that the availability of the death penalty as
punishment for certain crimes cannot be linked to any
measureable decline in the occurrence of crime. 272 This leaves the
retribution theory as the only viable secular theory supporting the
death penalty. Because retribution theory is the strongest secular
theory used to support the death penalty, the question of whether
Rehabilitation theory is controversial because a myriad of factors
(psychological, biological, and social) are thought to come into play when an
individual chooses to commit a crime. Id.
268. Id.
269. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:
PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 2-4 (Yale Univ. Press 1981) (discussing
the rehabilitative ideal). The rehabilitation theory differs greatly from the
other theories discussed. This theory of punishment, or correction, was
popular in the late 1800s and became the dominant philosophy in the 1900s.
Id. This theory is the one most closely associated with the restorative justice
movement.
270. Henderson, supra note 6, at 991; see generally OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 45 (Little, Brown 1881) (stating that retribution
is "only vengeance in disguise"); Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of
Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 781 (1976).
The victims' rights movement focuses on the retribution theory, which is
sometimes called the revenge model of criminal punishment. Henderson,
supra note 6, at 991-94.
271. See, e.g., David Muhlhausen, The Death Penalty Deters Crime and
Saves Lives, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/Resea
ch/Testimony/The-Death-Penalty-Deters-Crime-and-Saves-Lives (summary of
his testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Property Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, the author argues that recent studies have found that the death
penalty deters murder). Cf. Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do
Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists,99 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2009) (discussing the claims by supporters of

the death penalty that recent studies have shown that the death penalty
deters crime).
272. See generally Radelet & Lacock, supra note 271, at 490.
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allowing the victims in a capital case to express their sentencing
opinions will negatively impact the retributive objectives of the
death penalty must be addressed. 273
Retribution theory is based on concepts regarding the
relationships between individuals and society. Retribution theory
can be divided into four main sub-categories. These sub-categories
differ according to the retributive purpose the punishment is
supposed to accomplish and include (1) vindication, (2) antivigilantism, (3) social-individual moral balance, and (4) societal
condemnation. 274 As explained below, proponents of none of these
retribution theories would have a strong argument against
allowing victims to express an opinion on sentencing in a capital
trial.
The vindication branch of the retribution theory focuses on
the individual who was harmed by the crime. Proponents of this
theory claim that wronged persons require vindication and that
their suffering will be relieved by punishing the offender. 275
Because the vindication theory of retributive punishment is
victim-centric, it cannot be used to argue against granting the
injured parties in a murder case an advisory role in sentencing. 276
The anti-vigilantism strain of the retribution theory holds
that punishment by the state should be allowed in order to stop
the victims of crime from striking back at the offender. 277 This
theory also cannot be used to support depriving the victims a
chance to express their opinions during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. Allowing the victims to express an opinion as to the
proper sentence to be imposed would in no way impede the state
from exercising its responsibility to prevent a mob from carrying

273. It has been argued-although without success-that when the family
members of the victim are opposed to the execution, the retributive interest of
the state in the execution is so diminished that it would be unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment. See Gardner, 234 P.3d at 1132, 1141-44
(arguing that executing an individual who's family is opposed to the
punishment is in violation of the Eighth Amendment). However, whether
allowing the family members to express their opinion---one way or anotherconcerning the death penalty in a capital case would destroy the retributive
impact of the sentence to be imposed is a different question.
274. CARTER, supra note 14, at 12.
275. Id. When a person commits a violent crime against another member of
society, so the theory goes, the moral balance between that person and society
is disturbed and will remain so until he or she is punished. Id.
276. Disallowing opinion testimony at the penalty phase of a capital murder
trial will only increase the victims' feelings of powerlessness, and therefore be
in opposition to the retributive purposes of punishment that seek to relieve the
suffering of the victims.
277. CARTER, supra note 14, at 12. By preventing the victims from taking
vigilante action, this theory holds that the perpetrator is protected against
disproportionate or inappropriate punishment.
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out the execution. 278
The moral balance theory focuses on the relationship between
the convicted person and society as a whole. It is based on the idea
that there is a moral balance between every individual and
society. 279 Allowing victim opinion testimony on sentencing would
not defeat the purpose of punishment under this theory.
Regardless of whether the jury chooses to follow the advice of the
victims, it would still have the responsibility to select the
punishment that, in its view, would restore the balance between
the convicted person and society as a whole.
Finally, the societal condemnation theory holds that the
retributive aspects of punishment allow for the symbolic
expression of society's condemnation of the perpetrator and the
act.280 The Robison court's statement that victims should not be
allowed to testify because the jury is appointed to act as the
conscience of the community is related to the societal
condemnation theory supporting the death penalty. However the
jury's duty to act as the conscience of the community would not be
threatened or undermined by being informed of the victims'
wishes. 28 1 Allowing victim sentencing opinion testimony would not
deter the symbolic expression of condemnation through
punishment. The convicted person would still be punished even if
the victims expressed an anti-death penalty opinion. If the jury
decided to follow that recommendation, society's expression of
condemnation could be satisfied by a sentence of life in prison. 282
Thus, allowing the victims to express an opinion as to whether a
murderer deserves to be put to death or deserves life
imprisonment would not diminish any of the retributive purposes
used to support the death penalty. 283
278. Even if victim opinion testimony were to be allowed in capital cases, the
state would remain in control of the convicted person, and the jury-or judgewould retain its right to make the final decision as to the method of
punishment.
279. CARTER, supra note 14, at 12.
280. Id.
281. If the jury were indeed the community as a whole, rather than loose
proximity of that community, it would include the victims themselves. As
members of the community, their opinions would count. And, if such a group
constituted a real community, as in the Middle Ages where people knew one
another, interacted on a daily basis, and relied upon one another, rather than
a group of faceless strangers, they would naturally take into consideration the
wishes of the victims.
282. Of course, some might argue that in extreme cases, society's
condemnation cannot be fully expressed by imposing a life sentence rather
than death. However, the jury represents society and it should be able to take
into consideration the wishes of those most directly harmed by the murder.
283. Another justification for the death penalty that is related to retributive
theories and is often cited in secular debates on the subject is the "eye-for-aneye" concept. Although based on scripture, this justification has been
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2. Victim Opinion Testimony and Religious Theories of
Punishment
Arguments derived from Christian and Jewish texts
frequently have been used both to support and to reject the death
penalty in the West. Courts, lawyers, scholars, and laypersons
regularly call upon biblical references to further their death
penalty arguments. These arguments focus either on G-d's stern
command to punish murderers with the death penalty or on New
Testament verses calling for forgiveness. 284 Thus, although the
United States is not overtly theocratic in its politics or law, the
influence of Judaic law and Christian thought is still significant
when grappling with difficult moral issues in court and society. 285
However, the role of the victim in criminal prosecutions is not
clearly defined in the Bible. Neither side of the death penalty
argument focuses on the right of the victims to make the decision.
The arguments tend to focus on G-d's relationship with man in
general, society's responsibility to punish wrongdoers, or the call

advocated by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, and not based on an

argument that the Biblical authority is to be obeyed without question, but
rather on the "principle of equality." CARTER, supra note 14, at 11 (citing
William E. Connolly, The Will, Capital Punishment, and Culture War, in THE
KILLING STATE; CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 190
(Austin Sarat ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999)).
284. See Bruce S. Ledewitz & Scott Staples, Reflections on the Talmudic and
American Death Penalty, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33, 34 (1993)
(recognizing the presence of the death penalty in ancient Israel and describing
the Talmudic rules and procedures for capital punishment); Gary J. Simson &
Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin' On Heaven's Door: Rethinking The Role of
Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1090, 1110 (2001)
(stating that "[p]articularly at the penalty phase, it is not uncommon in capital
cases for the prosecution or defense or both to invoke religion in closing
arguments. The Bible is a favorite source for both sides. While prosecutors
never seem to tire of seizing upon the famous 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth' passage to exhort the jury to sentence to death, defense attorneys have
argued against death by drawing on passages such as those recounting G-d's
choice of penalties less than death to punish Cain for killing his brother
Abel.") (footnotes omitted); Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein, The Use of
Religion in Death Penalty Sentencing Trials, 30 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 675, 677
(2006) (discussing several recent cases where Biblical verses were used in the
sentencing phase of death penalty trials); Courtney Rachel Baron, An Eye For
An Eye Leaves Everyone Blind: Fields v. Brown and the Case for Keeping the
Bible Out of Capital Sentencing Deliberations, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 369, 392
(2009) (stating that "by relying on Biblical law, jurors impermissibly abdicate
their responsibility to apply the law prescribed by the judge to the facts
presented in evidence."). Cf. Proof of Religion in the Courtroom That Violates
the Right to a Fair Trial 73 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 89 § 8 (2003)
(discussing whether a potential juror may be excused because his or her
religious beliefs would preclude a sentence of death).
285. See Baron, supra note 284, at 373 (describing a number of cases where
jurors relied on Biblical passages while deliberating during the penalty phases
of a capital punishment trial).
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for collective societal forgiveness-which is to be expressed by the
collective judgment of the jury members. In contrast, under
Islamic law, some of these issues are less confused. The victims
determine whether to impose the death penalty, and forgiveness is
encouraged by G-d. In the West, however, it is a matter of debate
whether the death penalty is required by G-d as the punishment
for murder, and the role of the victim is unclear. Those arguments
will be discussed more fully below.
a. Arguments from Judaism
In the five books of the Old Testament that make up the
Pentateuch, or Torah, the death penalty is the prescribed penalty
for more than twenty crimes, including murder. 286 The most wellknown verses from the Torah used to justify the death penalty on
religious grounds contain the eye-for-an-eye, or lex talionis,
principle. The lex talionis verse from Leviticus states as follows:
"And he that killeth any man shall surely be put to death....
Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a
blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again."287 This verse
and other imperatives from the Torah have often been quoted in
capital punishment cases as persuasive authority designed to
286. See CHRISTIAN BRUGGER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND ROMAN CATHOLIC
MORAL TRADITION 60-61 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 2003) (listing the crimes
punishable by death, which included offenses against unorthodox religious
beliefs and practices and miscellaneous other crimes including theft,
deception, violence, murder, and deviant sexual behavior). There is some
disagreement among scholars as to the exact number of crimes for which
death is the prescribed penalty in the Torah. See Daniel A. Rudolph, The
Misguided Reliance In American Jurisprudence On Jewish Law To Support
The Moral Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 437,
443-44 (1996) (stating that some scholars place the number as high as thirtysix and listing six categories of crimes punishable by death).
287. Leviticus 24:17 (King James) ("And he that killeth any man shall surely
be put to death."); Leviticus 24:19-21 (King James) ("And if a man cause a
blemish in his neighbour; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him; Breach
for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a blemish in a man,
so shall it be done to him again.And he that killeth a beast, he shall restore it:
and he that killeth a man, he shall be put to death.") (emphasis in original).
See also Exodus 21:23-25 (King James) ("And if any mischief follow, then thou
shalt give life for life, [e]ye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,
[b]urning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."); Genesis 9:6 (King
James) ("Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in
the image of G-d made he man."); Deuteronomy 19:11-13, 21 (King James)
("But if any man hate his neighbour, and lie in wait for him, and rise up
against him, and smite him mortally that he die, and fleeth into one of these
cities: Then the elders of his city shall send and fetch him thence, and deliver
him into the hand of the avenger of blood, that he may die. Thine eye shall not
pity him, but thou shalt put away the guilt of innocent blood from Israel, that
it may go well with thee .... And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go for
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.") (emphasis in
original).
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influence jurors to encourage jurors to impose the death penalty. 288
However, these verses should be understood in relation to the
society in which they were first advanced.
In the ancient kingdom of Israel, murder of the innocent was
considered an especially grievous sin and a crime that potentially
affected the whole community. It was not only considered simply a
crime against a fellow human, but also a crime against G-d, who
was thought to have exclusive dominion over life and death. 289 For
such a crime, capital punishment was not only demanded by G-d,
it was also thought to expiate evil from the murderer and to purify
the community as a whole. 290
Although murder was considered a crime against the
community, condemned by G-d, and punished by the state, the
victim maintained an active role in the process of punishing, and
even executing, criminals. Prior to the development of formal legal
procedures among the ancient Israelites, it was the responsibility
of the close relatives of a murdered individual to extract bloodrevenge from the perpetrator. 291 Even after the Israelites
developed more formal legal procedures, it was still the
292
responsibility of the blood relatives to instigate the execution.
By the end of the second temple period, capital punishment
began to fall into disfavor.293 Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the
state performing executions under certain circumstances was not
questioned, as capital punishment had been commanded by G-d in
the Torah. 294 The dictates of Jewish law, especially the Torah,
288. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 692-93, 692 n.6 (Cal. 1998)
(discussing how the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking the jury to
rely on Bible verses in his closing argument, and the court listed the following
cases where the prosecutor had similarly committed misconduct by relying on
the eye for an eye verses); State v. Rouse, 451 S.E.2d 543, 560-62 (N.C. 1994)
(upholding the prosecutor's reference to the eye for an eye principle in a
capital case); People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1134-35, 1134 n.18 (Cal. 1993)
(discussing how the prosecutor referred to the Old Testament in support of
imposing the death penalty); Ex parte Waldrop, 459 So. 2d 959, 962 (Ala.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985) (describing how the prosecutor
referred to the death penalty as consistent with the laws of G-d).
289. BRUGGER, supra note 286, at 61.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 61-62.
293. Id. at 62. See also Ledewitz & Staples, supra note 284, at 34-36
(discussing the rigorous procedural and proof requirements and arguing that if
these were followed, the death penalty would have been almost non-existent,
and recognizing that certain scholars condemned courts for executing even one
person in seventy years); Rudolph, supra note 286, at 445-47 (arguing that the
death penalty was not carried out very often in the Talmudic era as the rabbis
during that period attempted to use interpretation of the Torah to make the
death penalty a rare occurrence).
294. See Ledewitz & Staples, supra note 284, at 34 (recognizing that even
though the death penalty was controversial and was severely limited under
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remain an important justification for supporting the death penalty
in the United States. This is true even though in ancient Israel the
death penalty was not imposed with anything approaching the
regularity with which it is imposed today in the United States.
b. Christianity and the Death Penalty
The New Testament contains several ambiguous verses
dealing with the death penalty. 295 Nowhere is it absolutely
condemned. Nevertheless, various verses of the New Testament
have been used by proponents of the death penalty. 296 In fact, for
most of Christian history, official Church leaders, and seemingly
the majority of the public, accepted the death penalty as a
legitimate form of punishment for certain crimes. They did not
question the authority of the state to carry out the death penalty
in appropriate cases. 297 Unlike the role of the state in executions,
the role of the clergy in such proceedings was, however,
questionable. During certain historical periods, the Church was
not allowed to participate in capital cases at all. When the issue
was heresy, however, the Church was more likely to be involved in
a trial leading to the infliction of capital punishment. 298
Jewish law, "Judaism still permitted, even required, that certain persons
would die for their crimes.").
295. See BRUGGER, supra note 286, at 60 (discussing various verses in the
Old Testament that could be considered to be either in favor of the death
penalty, or at least accepting of its legitimacy).
296. Id. at 64 (citing John 8:3-7 (King James)) (referencing several stories
from the New Testament including the story of the woman convicted of
adultery for whom Jesus told the crowd, "you who are without sin, cast the
first stone" but noting the story does not condemn the death penalty per se,
but only advocates forgiveness by the community of the woman's sin). See also
Matthew 5:38-39 (King James) (stating that "[y]e have heard that it hath been
said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye
resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him
the other also.") (emphasis added).
297. BRUGGER, supra note 286, at 63-65, 74-75. The role of the clergy in
inflicting the death penalty changed during the twelfth century. During that
period, the clergy were forbidden to take part in the infliction of the death
penalty. Id. at 96-97. However, in the oath of Waldensian, Pope Innocent III
stated that it was acceptable for the civil authority to administer the death
penalty without the risk of moral sin. Id. at 103. In addition, Thomas Aquinas
supported corporal punishment in general and capital punishment in
particular as "medicinal." Id. at 108. He argued that it was medicinal in that it
contributed to the emendation of the convicted, the deterrence of others, and
the order of justice. Id. In other words, Aquinas considered it healthy for the
social community to expiate the criminal from its presence, and to thereby cut
out a dangerous and corrupting presence from the body of the community. He
stated: "[I]f any one is dangerous and corrupting to the community on account
of some of some sin, it is praiseworthy and salubrious that he be killed, in
order to preserve the common good." Id. at 109-10.

298. Id. at 11.6-22 (stating that the Catholic Church was involved in heresy
trials during the High Middle Ages and in the seventeenth century).

2010]

Shari'ah and Choice

53

It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that
Catholic thinkers began to question, in any serious and systematic
way, the legitimacy of the death penalty.299 The American Bishops
led the charge in the Catholic Church against the death penalty by
making a number of pronouncements, culminating in the 1980
statement on capital punishment in which they outlined ten
reasons to abolish the death penalty.3 00 In 2001, the Holy See
issued a declaration calling for the abolishment of the death
penalty, which can be taken as the official position of the Catholic
Church today.301
The conservative evangelical Protestants, on the other hand,
have often accepted and encouraged the use of the death penalty.
For example, the United States Southern Baptist Convention, the
largest denomination in the United States, has issued a clear
statement advocating the use of the death penalty. 302 Other
strands of Protestantism in the United States are mixed in their
support of the death penalty.3 03 Most "main-line," or nonevangelical denominations, oppose the death penalty. 304 The
Protestants, like the Jews, are split along liberal and conservative
lines.3 05
Currently, proponents of the death penalty, prosecutors,
jurors, and victims who want the defendant executed tend to favor
verses from the Torah, or Old Testament, to support their position.
In general, they rely on the lex talionisverses and argue that it is
the religious duty of the jury to remove the defendant from the
community through execution. However, opponents of the death
penalty, including defense attorneys, tend to appeal to the juries to
exercise leniency in court based on verses from the New
Testament that discuss forgiveness. For example, a favorite quote
from the New Testament regarding forgiveness comes from the
Book of Matthew: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for
an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist

not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to

299. Id. at 132-33.
300. Id. at 136-37.
301. Id. (citing DECLARATION OF THE HOLY SEE TO THE FIRST WORLD
CONGRESS ON THE DEATH PENALTY (Strasbourg June 21, 2001)).
302. The resolution approved at the SBC's year 2000 assembly states, in
part: "G-d authorized capital punishment for murder after the Noahic Flood,
validating its legitimacy in human society . . . [messengers (delegates of the
SBC)] support the fair and equitable use of capital punishment by civil
magistrates as a legitimate form of punishment for those guilty of murder or
treasonous acts that result in death." B.A. Robinson, Policies of Religious
Groups Towards the Death Penalty, RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE (Apr. 10, 2009),
http://www.religioustolerance.org/execut7.htm#sbc.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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him the other also."306 However, the role of the victim in making
these life and death decisions when it is the state exercising its
authority to determine whether a person should be executed is
somewhat ambiguous under both Judaism and Christianity.30 7
Nevertheless, ideas taken from both Christianity and
Judaism infuse death penalty thought and jurisprudence,
sometimes taking on manifestly obvious forms, sometimes lurking
unexamined in the minds of prosecutors, judges, juries, and the
family members of the victims. Regardless of whether it is
appropriate or unconstitutional for government officials to make
reference to Judeo-Christian writings and sensibilities, their
influence on our death penalty jurisprudence, including the role of
the victims in a trial, should not be ignored.
In contrast to the ambiguity of the victims' role in a capital
murder trial and sentencing pursuant to Christian and Jewish
thought, under Islam, the most recent manifestation of the
Abrahamic religions, victims of murder have a central place in the
decision-making when it comes to whether to impose the death
penalty for murder. It is useful to examine the treatment of the
victims of murder under Islamic law to help us consider what our
system might have been like if the crime of homicide had never
been categorized as a crime against the Crown and the Christian
and Jewish texts had been clearer about the role of the victim in a
homicide prosecution.
PART TWO: ISLAM AND VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN SENTENCING
I. OVERVIEW
Islamic law is religious law based on the Qur'an and the
teachings and examples of the Prophet Muhammad. Islamic law is
older than the common law and the civil law, yet it is connected to
both. In order to understand Islamic law, one must first have a
basic understanding of Islam, but Islam is not easily summarized.
It is a complex and varied religion incorporating many different
sects, interpretations, and practices. 308 Islam is a monotheistic
306. Matthew 5:38-39 (King James).
307. Another story from the New Testament that is often used by opponents
of the death penalty comes from the Book of John. Here, a woman had been
convicted of committing adultery by the authorities, and was about to be
executed by stoning. John 8:3-11 (King James). The crowd, representing the
community, was to carry out the execution by throwing rocks at the woman
until she was bludgeoned to death. Id. According to the account in John, Jesus
tried to put a stop to the execution by exhorting the crowd, "He that is without
sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." Id. However, this the story
does not condemn the death penalty per se, but only advocates forgiveness by
the community of the woman's sin by reminding them that each person is also
a sinner.
308. See generally TAHA JABIR AL ALWANI, THE ETHICS OF DISAGREEMENT IN
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religion and shares a close kinship with Judaism and
Christianity. 309 However, Muslims believe that Islam represents
the final disclosure of G-d's will through his Prophet, Muhammad,
and that the Qu'ran is the direct word of G-d as revealed to the
Prophet Muhammad. 310 Islam literally means the submission to
the will of G-d. A Muslim is one who submits to the will of G-d.311
Muslims are required to make Islam a part of their daily
consciousness and to act according to the will of G-d in everything
they do. Islamic law serves as a guide to Muslims attempting to
act in accordance with G-d's will in daily life.3 12 However, the
religion itself is not simply a set of rules to follow. There are
spiritual and mystical aspects as well. These features of Islam are
important in understanding Islamic law because, unlike Western
law, the divine and the temporal are fused to the belief system

ISLAM (A.S. al Shaikh-Ali ed., Int'l Inst. of Islamic Thought 1993) (describing

the current divisions among Muslims and providing a guide to disagreement
based on the examples of the classical jurists); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE
STRAIGHT PATH 114-55 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1988) (discussing the
diversity of the modern movements in Islamic thought); MALISE RUTHVEN,
ISLAM IN THE WORLD 181-226 (Oxford Univ. Press 1984) (describing and
explaining the origins of the sects in Islam); Devin J. Stewart, Taqiyyah as
Performance: The Travels of Baha al-Din al-Amili in the Ottoman Empire
(991-93/1583-85), in LAW AND SOCIETY IN ISLAM 1-3 (Devin J. Stewart et al.
eds., Marcus Weiner Publishers 1996) (discussing historical treatment of
diverse sects of Islam within Muslim majority societies).
309. ESPOSITO, supra note 308, at 3-4 (explaining the links between the
three Abrahamic religions). As stated by John Esposito:
Islam stands in a long line of Semitic, prophetic religious traditions
that share an uncompromising monotheism, and belief in G-d's
revelation, His prophets, ethical responsibility and accountability, and
the Day of Judgment. Indeed, Muslims, like Christians and Jews, are
the Children of Abraham, since all trace their communities back to him.
Islam's historic religious and political relationship to Christendom and
Judaism has remained strong throughout history. This interaction has
been the source of mutual benefit and borrowing as well as
misunderstanding and conflict.
Id.
310. See id. (describing the relation of Islam to Christianity and Judaism
through the legacy of the Patriarch Abraham). Islam incorporates much of the
Jewish and Christian religious traditions, but Muslims believe that the final
revelation from G-d came from Muhammad, the last prophet. See KAREN
ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 8-10 (Modern Library 2002)
(describing the Qu'ran as the word of G-d).
311. ARMSTRONG, supra note 310, at 5. See also RODOLPHE J.A. DE SEIFE,
THE SHARI'AH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISLAM 5 (Austin & Winfield
1994) (setting forth the definitions of Islamic law).
312. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI'AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 1-3
(Oneworld Publications 2008). Muslims are called to abstain from certain
practices, and are required to adhere to the five pillars of Islam that require
daily prayer, giving alms to the poor, fasting during the month of Ramadan,
going on a pilgrimage to Mecca, and believing that there is no G-d but Allah
and Muhammad is his Prophet. ESPOSITO, supra note 308, at 89-93.
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that gave birth to the Islamic legal tradition.
When discussing and seeking to define Islamic law, it is
important to acknowledge that Islamic law is as varied and
complex as Islam itself, even if the discussion is limited to the
"classical" Islamic jurisprudence.3 13 It has been practiced in many
different societies and in different ways over the last 1,400 years.
Modern societies that incorporate Islamic Shari'ahinto their legal
systems do so in a wide variety of ways; most have mixed classical
Islamic jurisprudence with codes influenced by Western legal
systems. 314 Some people use the terms Shari'ah and Islamic law
interchangeably. However, this is not correct. The Shari'ah,which
literally means, "the way" or "the path," is revealed law or G-dgiven law, and it is found in the Qur'an and in the Sunnah of the
Prophet. 3 15
The term Islamic law is broader than the term Shari'ah.
Islamic law incorporates other sources of jurisprudence that
include the works of the scholars interpreting the Shari'ah. This
man-made gloss on the Shari'ah,is known as the Fiqh, or Islamic
jurisprudence. Islamic jurisprudence is divided among several
schools of thought that were formed by certain scholars during the
classical period of Islamic civilization, roughly from the ninth
through the eleventh centuries. In addition to the Shi'a schools of
thought, there are four major Sunni schools of thought. 316 For the
purpose of this Article, the author has drawn on the Sunni schools
313. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV.
1015, 1015-25 (1991) (discussing modern and pre-modern diversity in Islamic
law and institutions); Ron Shaham, Preface to RON SHAHAM, LAW, CUSTOM,
AND STATUTE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: STUDIES IN HONOR OF AHARON LAYISH,
at vii-xi (Ron Shaham ed., Brill 2007) (introducing an analysis of the
relationship between Arab customary law and the shari'a); WAEL B. HALLAQ,
AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC LAw (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2001) (providing an in-depth analysis of the development of classical
Islamic law); see generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
ISLAMIC LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) (tracing the beginnings of Islamic
law); NOEL J. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE (Univ. of Chi. Press 1969).
314. See generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW
87-162 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) (describing the effects of colonization,
modernization and Islamic movements on the development of Islamic law in
modern nation states). See also Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin's Call and
the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law 56
AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 423-24 (2008) (explaining that the American legal
academy falsely relies on the assumption that contemporary Islamic rules are
derived from classical doctrine and suggests that scholars should take into
consideration contemporary global political and economic forces shaping
modern Islamic law).
315. KAMALI, supra note 312, at 16.
316. KHALED ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD'S NAME: ISLAMIC LAW,
AUTHORITY AND WOMEN 9-11 (Oneworld Publications 2003) (2001) (discussing
the various schools of thought and the divisions within the schools of thought).

2010]1

Shari'ah and Choice

57

of thought. Although there are differences between these legal
traditions, fortunately the main points that are made in this
Article are related to very basic Islamic legal concepts, and any
minor differences in interpretation of the finer points of the law of
homicide and the victims' role in prosecution under Classical
Islamic law are beyond the scope of this Article and need not be
addressed.
A. The Religious Characterand Purpose of Islamic Law
Because Islamic law is religious law, the concept of law in
Islamic law is much broader than the concept of law in the secular
West.3 17 Islamic law sets forth duties owed to G-d, duties to the
state (or community), and duties owed to other people. There is no
clear division between religious and secular duties under Islamic
law. 318 Therefore, the purpose of Islamic law is broader than
Western law in that it regulates the relationship between G-d and
the individual as well as relationships between individuals and the
relationship between the government and the people. 319 It has both
religious and secular characteristics, and ideas about morality are
tightly interwoven into all the aspects of the law. The pervasive
nature of Islamic law is linked to the Islamic ideal that every
aspect of life is governed by G-d's divine purpose. 320 Thus, much of
Islamic jurisprudence has to do with the proper way to worship or
carry out daily activities, subjects Westerners would not normally
associate with legal mandates. However, within Islamic law there
are a number of topics that fit within the Western
conceptualization of law.
B. Sources of Islamic Law: The Qur'an,the Sunna, and Fiqh
In Islamic legal analysis and methodology, the verses in the
Qur'an are considered fundamental law and represent the highest
legal authority in Islamic law. 321 In this way, the Qur'an is similar
317. See NAGATY SANAD, THE THEORY
RESPONSIBILITY IN ISLAM LAW: SHARI'A 45-46

OF

CRIME

AND

CRIMINAL
1991)

(Off. of Int'l Crim. Just.

(describing the debate surrounding the use of criminal law to protect the
moral values of the community). See also BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF
ISLAMIC LAW 8, 18-23 (The Univ. of Ga. Press 2006) (1998) (discussing how
Shari'ah "includes norms beyond those that constitute law in the strict[est]
sense").
318. WEISS, supra note 317, at 21 (discussing the moral and legal
implications of the marriage contract in Islamic law).
319. Id.
320. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law, and the Protection of
Human Rights in the Islamic Criminal Justice System, in THE ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 12-13 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., Oceana
Publications, Inc. 1982) (stating that the conduct of man should be in his
individual and collective capacity can be found in Islamic law).
321. DOI, supra note 3, at 25-29.
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to the Constitution of the United States. However, the Qur'an can
never be altered and is not subject to criticism because every verse
is considered to be the direct word of G-d. 322 In addition, only a
small percentage of the Qur'an is devoted to legal rules.
The second highest authority is the Sunna.323 The Sunna
consists of the cases decided by the Prophet, using his words and
deeds. 324 This collection of the works and words of the Prophet
were passed down by those who knew the Prophet during his life
and serves to clarify the meaning of the Qur'an. 325 In the Prophet's
last sermon, he told the people to "obey G-d's book and his
Prophet's Sunna," therefore the Sunna is mandatory authority. 326
Together, the Qur'an and the Sunna make up Shari'ah.
Of course, not all questions are answered fully in the Qur'an
and the Sunna. Thus, Islamic jurisprudence developed by legal
scholars is also consulted and serves as another source of Islamic
law. When the highly respected scholars of all the schools of
jurisprudence agree on a question, there is a "consensus of the
scholars" or jima. A jima is very persuasive authority on any
issue. 327 Although there are other sources of Islamic law, this
limited discussion of Islamic theory, jurisprudence, and
methodology is sufficient to address the issue of victims
commenting at sentencing. 328
322. Id. at 21. Nevertheless, there is some room for disagreement and
interpretation of the verses themselves. The first Muslim scholars engaged in
this analysis of Qur'anic texts. While some verses are clear and require no
explanation or interpretation, some are less clear. Moreover, some verses are
general, and some are specific. And some verses have arguably been abrogated
by later revealed verses. Thus, the first step in Islamic legal analysis is
exegesis, the science of Ta/sir. Mujtahid are experts qualified to interpret the
Qur'an through the science of ta/sir. They strive to understand the specific
language of the applicable Qur'anic text and categorizing it accordingly. Id. at
22-30.
323. Id. at 28.
324. MATTHEW LIPPMAN ET AL., ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE

30-31 (Praeger 1988).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 31.
327. Id. at 31-32. According to Lippman "[c]onsensus itself is legitimized by
the Qur'anic text, 'Ye are the best of Peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoying
what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in G-d.' The Prophet
stated in a Hadith, 'My community shall never unite upon error."' Id. at 32
(citing THE QUR'AN, supra note 1, at 3:110). See also Taymour Kamel, The
Principle of Legality and its Application in Islamic Criminal Justice, in THE
ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 155-56 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982))
(noting that while jima is a "consensus of the community through its
competent representatives" of Islamic jurists, it is an inferior authority due to
its unstable nature, being revocable when consensus changes). Consensus, or
ijma, is supported in the Qur'an and in a Hadith. Id. at 155. It is stated in the
Qur'an that the believers will not all be in error in interpretation of the Qur'an
at once. Id.
328. The fourth level of Islamic legal authority is the argumentation by
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There is a highly developed body of jurisprudence within
Islamic law that deals with criminal law (as is also true with
respect to rules of trade, government, inheritance, marriage,
divorce, and property). The Islamic law regarding criminal
punishment is justified through use of principles similar to those
used to justify criminal punishment in modern American law: for
example, to deter further criminal activity, to rehabilitate the
offender, to protect society against the offender, and as a means
for retribution. 329 Yet the law itself-the equivalent of Western
substantive law-remains of a religious character. This leads to
33 0
several important consequences.
Most importantly, as religious law, Shari'ahlaw functions as
33 1
It
a "moralizing instrument as well as a preventative agent."
seeks to reform the individual, purify his conscience, warn against
committing offenses, prohibit acts that would lead to more serious
criminal offenses, recognize moral fallibility, and encourage social
and economic justice. 332 In addition, some of the crimes carry not
33 3
only punishment on earth, but also a penalty in the afterlife.

analogy or qiyas. LIPPMAN, supra note 324, at 32. Since every possible legal
question could not be addressed in the Qur'an or in the Sunna, legal scholars
and judges are allowed to use analogical reasoning to decide a case by relating
it to those situations which are covered in the Qur'an or in the Sunna. Id. at
32. However, some schools of legal thought are in dispute as to the validity of
this type of analysis. Id. There are a number of other methods of discovering
the Islamic law, including but not limited to custom, the use of personal
reasoning, and developing Shari'ahoriented policy attuned to modern society.
See KAMALI, supra note 312, at 53-54 (explaining that the Shari'ahappears to
incorporate common views of the community and known community practices
into the "fabric of its laws").
329. PETERS, supra note 2, at 30.
330. These include the following: (1) There is a unity between the
relationship between the Islamic criminal law prohibitions and the belief in
one G-d; (2) A person who has committed a crime under Islamic law will face
both earthly and eternal punishment, unless he or she repents; (3) The
spiritual aspect of the criminal law serves as an internal deterrence in that
the Muslim's belief in G-d will prevent him from committing crimes that are
offensive to G-d; and (4) The application of Islamic criminal law is not a task
left to the discretion of the state, but rather is a required function of the
Muslim government. PETERS, supra note 2, at 47.
331. See SANAD, supra note 317, at 49 (explaining that the status as a
moralizing instrument is obtained by seeking to reform the individual and
clear his conscience, warning people against committing offenses through
harsh punishment, requiring Muslims to aid one another in the search for
righteousness, preventing crime by restricting access to the materials
necessary for commission, and requiring the rich to aid those less fortunate).
332. Id. at 49-50.
333. Id. at 50. The punishment for murder extends to the afterlife; as the
Qur'an states: "If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell,
to abide therein (forever): and the wrath and curse the curse of Allah are upon,
him, and a dreadful chastisement is prepared for him." THE QUR'AN, supra
note 1, at 4:93.

60

The John MarshallLaw Review

This leads the majority of Islamic scholars to
importance of atonement: the idea that if a criminal
this life, he will not be punished for his crime
afterlife. 334 The theological dimension of crime
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C. Taxonomy of Crimes in ClassicalIslamic Law
In keeping with the purpose and theory of Islamic law, the
penalties for the commission of a crime and the procedures that
are to be followed in the prosecution and sentencing of a
perpetrator are dependent on whether the crime is one for which
the punishment is prescribed in the Qur'an, one for which the
punishment is retaliation or payment of a fine, or one for which
the punishment is discretionary. Islamic Shariahlaw thus divides
crimes into three categories: hudud, ta'azir,and qisas.336
The hudud are sometimes considered crimes against G-d
because their punishments are prescribed in the Qur'an and in the
Sunna.33 7 Hudud crimes include theft, highway robbery, rebellion,
illegal sexual relations (zina), false accusation of zina, drinking
alcohol, and apostasy (renouncing Islam).33 8 As crimes against G-d,

334. SANAD, supra note 317, at 31 (quoting FRANK VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND
LEGAL SYSTEM; STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA 241 (Brill 2000), for the following
hadith: "The hand of the repentant thief precedes him into heaven," but noting
that the hadith is not found in the authoritative canon of ahadith).
335. Id. at 27. A minority of Islamic scholars contends that for atonement to
be achieved in the afterlife, the offender must sincerely repent the acts he has
committed, and the earthly punishment alone will not lead to atonement for
the sinful aspect of the crime. See id. at 31 (noting the Hanafites argument
regarding repentance and atonement). See also KAMALI, supra note 312, at
191-92 (arguing that the Qu'ran has proscribed punishment that is not
mandatory for theft, adultery, slanderous accusation, and highway robbery
because references punishments for such crimes are followed by descriptions
of reformation and repentance).
336. SANAD, supra note 317, at 40-41.
337. Id. According to Sanad, "[t]herefore, the prosecution of such crimes is
mandatory, and punishment must be imposed exactly as prescribed in the
Qur'an or the Sunna. Once guilt has been proven, no human judge, governor,
or even imam (ruler) can increase, reduce, probate, or suspend the sentence."
Id. at 50.
338. LIPPMAN, supra note 324, at 39-41. See also SANAD, supra note 317, at
50 (explaining the dispute over which crimes constitute hudud crimes, with
scholars agreeing solely on adultery, theft, banditry, and defamation).
Scholars disagree as to whether drinking alcohol and apostasy are hudud
crimes. Id. See also KAMALI, supra note 312, at 191, 220 (noting that the
punishments for drinking alcohol and apostacy are not set forth in the Qur'an,
but rather are found in the books of fiqh, and arguing that apostasy should not
be considered a hudud crime because the Qur'an specifically provides for
freedom of choice in religion). However all agree that zina, theft, highway
robbery and false accusation of zina are hudud crimes. Id. at 191-93.
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hudud crimes are considered the most serious. 339 The punishments
for such crimes vary in severity, ranging from applying lashes, to
amputation, to execution. 340 However, all such punishments are
corporal in form.341
Ta'azir crimes are those transgressions described in the
Qur'an or the Sunna for which no punishment is specified. 342
Among the ta'azir crimes are embezzlement, perjury, and
sodomy.34 3 Although the death penalty is not usually imposed for
ta'azir crimes, it can be meted out in exceptional circumstances. 344
However, the victims of these crimes may request that the state
pardon the defendant, and the judge has the discretion to grant or
deny such a request.3 45
The qisas are crimes against the body of a person. 346 Homicide
is a qisas crime. After the hudud crimes, qisas crimes are the most
serious under the Islamic Shari'ah.347 The word qisas actually
means retribution by the infliction of equivalent harm. 348 One of
the results of classifying intentional homicide as a qisas crime was
to deter the blood feuds that were common in Arabia. By limiting
retribution to the harm committed, excessive retribution through
tribal feuding was restricted.3 49
339. SANAD, supra note 317, at 50.
340. Id. at 51-56.
341. Id. at 56. Corporal punishment is defended by Professor Sanad on the
following grounds:
[C]orporal punishments in Islamic law are carried out in a swift manner
and are effective in deterring the individual from committing that crime
once again. In addition, the individual (male) is not separated from his
family as he would be if imprisoned, and thereby prevented from
supporting them and controlling them. This method is therefore
preferable to incarceration in prison, which is a drain on public
resources and a training school for further criminal activity.
Id. at 57.
342. Id. at 63. See also KAMAL3, supra note 312, at 188-89 (explaining that
the judge has the discretion to specify punishment for ta'azircrimes from a list
of accepted penalties).
343. SANAD, supra note 317, at 64.
344. EL-AWA, supra note 31, at 109. According to E1-Awa, there is a split
between the schools of thought as to which Ta'zir crime merit the death
penalty. Id. According to the Hanafi school, "the habitual homosexual, the
murderer on whom qisas cannot be imposed because of the means used in the
crime (al-gatl bil-muthgil), and the habitual thief who attacks a man's house
and who is not to be prevented from doing harm by means of other
punishments" are to be executed. Id. Under the Maliki school, the death
penalty will be imposed in cases of serious nature or where the defendant is
beyond reform. Id.
345. LIPPMAN, supra note 324, at 41.
346. Id. at 38.
347. SANAD, supranote 317, at 61.
348. Id.
349. DOI, supra note 3, at 232-34 (discussing the blood feud and the concept
of qisas in Arabia before the Qur'an was revealed).
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Qisas crimes include both intentional and unintentional harm
inflicted upon the body of another person. 350 However, physical
punishment will only be inflicted if the harm caused was
intentional. 351 Islamic law also recognizes varying degrees of
homicide based on the intent of the perpetrator and the manner of
the killing. Only some of these types of homicide are subject to the
qisas penalty.352 In addition, if there is less than conclusive proof
of the guilt of the defendant physical punishment will not be
extracted. 5 3 In cases of doubt, diyya, or monetary payment to the
victim's family, will be required.
There is a strong presumption of innocence under Islamic
Shari'ah,which was mandated by the Prophet Muhammad. 354 The
Prophet said, "[a]void condemning the Muslim to hudud whenever
you can and when you can find a way out for the Muslim then
release him for it. If the Imam errs it is better that he errs in favor
350. SANAD, supra note 317, at 61.
351. SANAD, supra note 317, at 61-63. According to Sanad, qisas
punishments are also limited in the following manner: (1) The accused must
be an adult who is of sound mind and understanding at the time of the act,
and the act must have been done intentionally; (2) The victim must be a
Muslim or Zimmi (Christian or Jew) or, according to the majority of writers, a
musta'min (a non-Christian or non-Jew who has entered the land of Islam
pursuant to a peace treaty); (3) Only the male blood relatives (father or
grandfather) in a line of ascendancy can claim qisas in the case of the death of
the victim: only the victim can claim it in the case of injury or maiming; (4) A
Muslim or Zimmi cannot be executed or maimed for the killing of someone not
a musta'min (i.e. pagan and apostates); (5) The infliction of the qisas must be
in the least painful manner; (6) The person who inflicts the qisas must have
the knowledge and competence which enable(s) him to inflict it. Id. Otherwise,
a professional executioner is assigned to carry out the sentence on behalf of
the victim or his family; (7) The person shall not inflict a greater degree of
harm than that which has been inflicted; (8) Talion (physical punishment)
should not be applied unless conclusive evidence exists. Id. Doubtful evidence
is valid to sustain diyya (monetary payment) only. Id.
352. LIPPMAN, supra note 324, at 50-51. Intentional killing with an
instrument that is recognized as a deadly weapon is called quatl al'amd, and it
is punishable by retaliation. Id. at 50. The intent to kill is ascertained by the
type of weapon used. If an instrument is used which is recognized as
potentially deadly, the intent to kill is inferred. Id. When a killing occurs that
is done with an instrument that is not one which is widely accepted as having
deadly potential, it is called qatl shibhu'l-'and.Id. at 51. The punishment for
this type of homicide is the payment of diyya and religious atonement and the
relinquishment of inheritance from the victim. Id. Third, the inadvertent
killing of another is called gat al-khata' and is punishable by requiring the
freeing of a Muslim slave, or paying compensation to the victim's family and
fasting. Id. Gatl al-khata' homicides are those which result from an error in
act or an error in intention. Id. Finally, gatl bi-sabab is a killing that is the
result of a chain of events which the defendant sets in motion. Id. It is
punished by requiring the defendant to pay monetary compensation and he
will lose the right to inherit. Id.
353. Id.
354. SANAD, supra note 317, at 72.
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of innocence than in favor of guilt."355 The judge is directed to
nullify the penalty if there is any doubt as to the guilt of the
accused. According to the Prophet, "[p]revent punishment in cases
of doubt. Release the accused if possible, for it is better that the
ruler be wrong in forgiving than wrong in punishing."3 5 6 In
keeping with this general regard for the rights of the accused, only
circumstantial evidence that tends to exonerate the accused will
be admitted; incriminating circumstantial evidence is excluded.357
II.

QISAS CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: THE ROLE OF THE
VICTIM's FAMILY IN CHOOSING THE PUNISHMENT
OF THE PERPETRATOR

Since murder is a qisas crime, which is against an individual,
the victim's relatives play an important role in the sentencing of
the defendant.358 The victim's heirs are encouraged to forgive the
offender. 359 According to the Qur'an:
We ordained therein for them: "Life for life, eye for eye, nose for
nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal." But if
anyone remits the retaliation by way of charity, it is an act of
atonement for himself. And if any fail to judge by (the light of) what
360
Allah hath revealed, they are (no better than) wrongdoers.
One of the traditions of the Prophet amplifies the
recommendation of forgiveness set forth in the Qur'an. According
to the Sunna, "[i]t is regarded as more meritorious to remit
retaliation . . . ."361 Short of total forgiveness, the family of the
victim of an intentional murder for which the qisas penalty may be
extracted may seek diyya, monetary payment. 362 This payment
serves to satisfy the victim's family, and no further punishment is
inflicted. If the defendant is unable to pay the diyya, which is a set
amount regardless of status of the victim or ability to pay of the
perpetrator, the state will pay it.363
The features of Islamic law that are most relevant to the
present discussion are (1) the prosecution by the victims' family
and (2) the right to forgive, or extract payment, in lieu of the death
penalty. The first difference is related to the dissimilar history of
the Arabian Peninsula and the surrounding Middle Eastern
355. Id.
356. Id. at 73.
357. Id.
358. LiPPMAN, supra note 324, at 51, 84-85.
359. EL-AWA, supra note 31, at 85.
360. THE QUR'AN, supra note 1, at 5:45.
361. EL-AWA, supra note 31, at 85.
362. Id. at 89. Intentional killing with a deadly weapon (gatl'al-'amd) is
among those types of homicide for which the qisas penalty may be extracted.
Id. at 89-90.
363. Id. at 89-90.

64

The John MarshallLaw Review

[44:1

cultures whose rulers did not find it necessary to remove the
victims from the process of prosecution and punishment of
murderers in order to consolidate their power and increase their
treasuries. The second difference comes from the Qur'an itself.
Unlike the Judeo-Christian texts, the Qur'an explicitly takes into
account the role of the victims of crime in sentencing. Jesus
preached that those who are wronged are encouraged to grant
forgiveness, but in the Qur'an, they are also empowered to
withhold the qisas penalty. Thus, although the state maintains
responsibility to punish the murderer out of concern for the
protection of society as a whole, its ability to inflict the death
penalty is limited by the right of the victims to forgive the
perpetrator.
In the West, as discussed previously, there was no
inevitability to the conversion of homicide from a private wrong to
a crime against the state and the official removal of the victims'
family members from sentencing decisions. This came about due to
particular historical circumstance and power struggles. Although
religious doctrine and belief should not be considered at a murder
trial, under the Anglo-American system it is nonetheless incorrect
to assume that the participants at capital trials in the United
States are unfamiliar with scriptural passages dealing with
murder and forgiveness. In fact, these scriptures are referred to in
many trials. If the scriptures were as clear as the Qu'ran in
placing the victims at the center of the prosecution and sentencing
decisions, and calls for mercy clearly encouraged, perhaps
American courts would not be so reluctant to find a place for the
victims to at least give their opinions on sentencing. Thus, such
testimony would not be considered either constitutionally or
inherently irrelevant, based on our historical criminal
jurisprudence. Nor would it be considered religiously or morally
irrelevant, based on our Judeo-Christian traditions. As victims
rights are gaining more and more attention, and as religious
leaders are becoming more outspoken in opposition to the death
penalty, perhaps it is time to reexamine the underlying and
unspoken barriers to victim sentencing opinion testimony.
Examining the treatment of victims under Islamic law provides a
perfect mirror for doing so.
PART THREE: PROPOSAL FOR ALLOWING VICTIM OPINION TESTIMONY
IN THE SENTENCING STAGE OF A CAPITAL CASE
Even when state legislatures have crafted victim rights
statutes, as was the case the Lynn, rather than analyze the issues
under the normal rules of evidence, weighing and balancing the
probative and prejudicial effect of the evidence, and come to a
determination based on the definitions of relevant evidence for a
sentence to consider, courts cling to the "special" rules of
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"constitutional relevance" discussed in Booth. This insistence to
classify all victim testimony in a homicide case as irrelevant stems
from the unexamined belief that homicide is a crime against the
state and that the true victims are mere interlopers in the system
that is bound to punish the perpetrator.
Some statements by the courts discussed above that invoke
the responsibility of the community as a whole to punish the
offenders and support their relevance determination with
reference to the classification of homicide as a crime against the
state rather than as an individual wrong lend credence to this
argument, and they are themselves irrelevant to the issues that
courts were charged with determining in those cases. For example,
courts' holdings about whether the testimony calling for leniency
was constitutionally permissible or relevant under the state
sentencing and victims' rights statutes lend credence to this
argument. Moreover, even if such considerations were relevant to
the issues discussed by the courts cited above, allowing the victims
to give an opinion on sentencing would not by any stretch of the
imagination convert the crime of murder back into an individual
wrong for which the state cannot exact punishment. Nor would the
jury abdicate any social responsibility as the voice of the
"community" to punish the defendant. Whether or not the jury was
influenced by a call for mercy, the jury would still recommend a
severe punishment for the defendant: life in prison.
While the Booth opinion may be intact as it applies to victim
opinion testimony that would allow the victims to incite the jury to
impose a punishment of death by requesting that the defendant be
given the death penalty, interpreting Booth to ban victims' calls
for leniency as constitutionally irrelevant in violation of the Eighth
Amendment stretches the holding of Booth beyond reason. Thus,
states whose courts have determined that Booth remains intact as
to victim opinion testimony should not shy away from enacting
legislation that allows the victims to express their views on
sentencing when they are calling for leniency.
As to the Oklahoma scheme, its constitutionality depends on
whether Payne overruled all of Booth by implication or whether, as
the majority of courts hold, it left intact the portion of Booth that
prohibited victim opinion testimony. Since the Supreme Court has
refused to answer this question, victims may testify either for
death or for leniency. As stated above, where victims call for
leniency, such testimony would not violate Booth. However, if
Oklahoma is correct that Booth was implicitly overruled in its
entirely by Payne, a simple statement as to whether the victims
want the death penalty to be imposed would not, in most cases,
cause the testimony to be more prejudicial than probative because,
after giving emotional impact testimony about the life of the victim
and the impact of his or her death and the crime on the family,
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most jurors would assume that the victim's family members are in
favor of the death penalty. Furthermore, even if the victim impact
testimony is constitutionally relevant to the harm caused by the
defendant, such testimony is often so emotionally laden that
whatever harm the Booth court sought to avoid by banning both
impact and opinion testimony will likely have occurred once the
impact testimony is given. It would take a very hard-hearted
person not to be swayed by the emotional impact of testimony
regarding the near death of a three-year-old, who witnessed the
brutal murder of his mother and siblings and who asks when they
are coming home.
For all these reasons, courts should interpret the ban on
victim opinion testimony as permitting statements calling for
leniency. Furthermore, legislatures should draft sentencing
statutes that define of victim impact testimony to include
statements regarding the proper sentence to be imposed. If the
Oklahoma model is followed, even victim statements calling for
the death penalty would cause little, if any, further prejudice to
the defendant. As for statements calling for mercy, under the
analysis set forth above, statutory definitions of victim impact
statements that include calls for mercy should be analyzed under
the normal rules of evidence and should survive any constitutional
challenges under Booth and Payne.
CONCLUSION
Though it is very unlikely that the law in the United States
will ever allow victims to have the final say in choosing a convicted
person's punishment, we can and should find some space in our
death penalty jurisprudence to allow the family members of a
victim to express their opinions as to the proper sentence to be
imposed. Even though most courts that have examined this issue
have determined that victim opinion testimony is irrelevant at the
sentencing stage of a capital murder trial, there is nothing sacred
about the rules of evidence. As long as the defendant's
constitutional rights are protected, the rules can be changed.
The reluctance to allow victim opinion testimony as to
sentencing can be traced to the historical development of the
concept of a crime against the state, a concept that has largely left
the victims out of the official criminal procedure in the United
States. Allowing the victims to voice an opinion at sentencing
would not in any way impinge on the jury's power to decide
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. A simple
statement by the witness as to whether the death penalty should
be imposed should be allowed. If the victims want the death
penalty, the court would have to engage in a weighing of the
probative versus prejudicial value of the statement. After hearing
the impact statements by the victims, a simple statement by the
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victims asking for the death penalty to be imposed would not be
prejudicial in most cases, as the jury would probably assume that
the victims want the death penalty. They are, after all, witnesses
presented by the prosecution.
When the victims call for mercy, the case for allowing victim
opinion testimony is even stronger. When the family members of
murder victims call for mercy, they are silenced by the prosecutors
and twisted interpretations of the Eighth Amendment. The
decision to impose the death penalty is supposed to be made on the
basis of an unemotional weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, taking into account the harm caused by the
murder-beyond simply the extinction of a human life. Mercy is
not considered a relevant consideration. The religious arguments
in favor of the death penalty in the United States normally focus
on the lex talionis verses of the Old Testament. Mercy is not called
for in these texts. The New Testament is sometimes quoted in
support of forgiveness. Jesus recommends personal forgiveness for
wrongs committed. But the language of those New Testament
verses is ambiguous when applied to a jury making a
determination as the representatives of the community whether to
impose the death penalty.
The support for the death penalty in the United States is
connected to the historical, religious, and philosophical backdrop of
Western civilization and culture. The place of the victim's family
at a trial for murder is also connected to those factors. If we
consider the role of the victims' family under Islamic law, we open
ourselves to the possibility that allowing the victims even the
slightest role in determining the sentence-for example, simply
advising the jury of their preference-would not threaten our
criminal justice system. It would empower victims, and in some
cases, provide a place for mercy in the courtroom. If a clear call for
mercy had been enshrined in our religious texts and adhered to
throughout generations of court proceedings, and had the medieval
law not converted homicide from a private wrong to a crime
against the state, courts today would not have the problems they
encounter in refusing to find such testimony relevant under state
law.

